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American copyright law has undergone an unappreciated conceptual
transformation over the course of the last century. Originally conceived of
as a form of private law—focusing on horizontal rights, privileges, and
private liability—copyright law is today understood principally through its
public-regarding goals and institutional apparatus, in effect as a form of
public law. This transformation is the result of changes in the ideas of law
and lawmaking that occurred in American legal thinking following World
War II, manifested in the deeply influential philosophy of the Legal Process
School of jurisprudence which shaped the modern American copyright
landscape. In the Legal Process conception, determining the substantive
content of the law is fundamentally a matter of identifying the institution
with formal competence (and legitimacy) to decide the matter, and then
deciphering its policies and directives for an area of law in a purposive
manner. The heyday of the Legal Process School, the 1950s and 1960s,
coincided with the period during which the current U.S. copyright regime
was being constructed. Several of its core lessons find direct veneration
therein, including: the centrality of legislation as the harbinger of copyright’s
policy and purposes; the primacy of collectivist copyright policy over
individual copyright principles; a recognition of the limitations of courts and
judge-made law; and the treatment of copyright as a specialized but
autonomous body of law requiring expert administration. As this Article
argues, the U.S. copyright regime is today better conceived of as a “legal
process,” wherein the law is dynamic, purposive, and multi-institutional in
origin. Modern copyright thinking would do well to embrace this reality and
develop mechanisms to deal with this fundamental—yet unacknowledged—
transformation, which explains a variety of perceived anomalies and
puzzles within the working of the system.
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INTRODUCTION
Modern American copyright law is not what it was less than a century ago.
Not only is the substantive content of current copyright law characterized by
an overbearing complexity, but the proliferation of institutional and private
actors within the system has fundamentally transformed its own
understanding of law and lawmaking, and thereby the very goals of copyright
law. Copyright’s formal blackletter directives undoubtedly originate in the
text of the Copyright Act of 1976,1 the most detailed copyright statute ever
enacted in the United States.2 Nevertheless, the statute is in many important
respects underinclusive and incomplete. This reality has required federal
courts to develop rules and principles for diﬀerent copyright questions,
sometimes working within the interstices of the statute’s directives and

Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codiﬁed as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–805 (2018)).
See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT xiii-xiv (1978) (lamenting the
complexity of the new Act and noting that its “body of detailed rules [is] reminiscent of the Internal
Revenue Code”); Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 857, 859 (1987) (describing it as a “detailed comprehensive code, chock-full of speciﬁc, heavily
negotiated compromises”); Barbara Ringer, First Thoughts on the Copyright Act of 1976, 22 N.Y.L.S.
L. REV. 477, 479 (1977) (describing the novelty of the new Act).
1
2
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congressional intent,3 and at other times out of whole cloth, guided by their
own sense of the system’s values.4
Adding to this legislative–judicial dynamic is the role that the Copyright
Oﬃce plays in developing copyright rules. As the agency with expertise in
the area, the Oﬃce regularly intervenes in copyright disputes, advises
Congress and other agencies on copyright matters, oﬀers its own
interpretation of statutory and judge-made law, and engages in notice-andcomment rulemaking in diﬀerent specialized domains.5 And then there is
private ordering. Customs, norms, and industry-wide collective practices
continue to ﬂourish and grow in a wide range of domains and thereby
introduce additional constraints on the behavior of actors.6 Some of these
norms and practices ﬁnd their way into the formal content of copyright’s rules
through judicial opinions, but most thrive independently.7
Determining what U.S. copyright law actually says about an issue is
therefore an indelibly complex exercise. It involves navigating the roles of the
system’s various institutional actors, unraveling their goals for the system and
their potential for realization, and then understanding how their respective
directives interact and coalesce to collectively constitute “copyright law.” Yet,
this complexity is hardly just an incidental byproduct of the system. As this
Article argues, it is instead the result of a particular and unique conception of
copyright law that has come to dominate modern American copyright
3 See, e.g., ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431, 440-50 (2014) (relying on legislative history
and the text of the statute to understand the deﬁnition of a “public performance”); Feist Publ’ns v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co. Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 354-61 (1991) (same with the originality doctrine); Pivot
Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 920-21 (7th Cir. 2004) (same with conceptual
separability for useful articles); Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (same
with the joint works doctrine); Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 505-07 (2d Cir. 1991) (same).
4 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 941 (2005)
(developing a standard of liability for inducement of infringement); Campbell v. Acuﬀ-Rose Music,
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (developing a “transformative use” defense within the fair use
context); Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706-12 (2d Cir. 1992) (developing
a test for assessing the infringement of computer software).
5 See 17 U.S.C. § 701(a)–(b) (2018) (detailing the “functions and duties” of the Register of
Copyright, the “director of the Copyright Oﬃce”); see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 101.3 (3d ed. 2017) (describing the
functions of the Copyright Oﬃce) [hereinafter U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM].
6 See generally Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293 (1996) (describing the emergence of collective
licensing within certain copyright industries); Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom
in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899 (2007) (discussing the use of custom in copyright—and
intellectual property law—more generally).
7 One such example of custom making its way into copyright doctrine is in the fair use doctrine.
See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 n.7, 593 (1985) (considering
“standard journalistic practice” in determining whether news organization’s taking was fair use);
Ringgold v. Black Entm’t. Television, 126 F.3d 70, 79-80 (2d Cir. 1997) (rejecting fair use defense
for failure to follow industry custom and pricing in licensing set decorations).
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thinking ever since the second half of the twentieth century. Built around the
ideas of the Legal Process School of legal analysis that was deeply inﬂuential
in the 1950s and 1960s,8 this approach to copyright law treats it principally as
a form of public law, wherein the advancement of the overall public welfare
takes normative precedence over—and thereby motivates—the promotion of
private interests, i.e., the interests of the author and of the user. Public
welfare is in turn understood as a multifaceted goal, constructed and realized
through the involvement of numerous public institutions that bring diﬀerent
collectivist values to the table, while imposing crucial checks on each other’s
power and legitimacy.
The modern legal process conception of copyright law is in stark contrast
to the approach that preceded it, which viewed the subject as one of private
law. Areas of private law—such as tort law, contract law, and property law—
are characterized by their primary emphasis on the private parties involved
in a legal dispute, and their individual interests at stake.9 To the extent that
they care about broader social goals and policies, they do so only ever through
the lens of the private dispute at hand.10 Within copyright law, this meant a
focus on the author’s rights and the defendant-user’s privileges and
immunities, with the broader public welfare a welcome byproduct of those
entitlements that was nonetheless secondary in importance.
Late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century copyright case law and
commentary epitomized this private law understanding. In a little known essay
published at the turn of the century, Christopher Columbus Langdell
characterized copyright law as the public’s (i.e., the “State[’s]”) intervention on
behalf of a private purpose, through its grant to authors of a “power to enforce”
a prohibition against unauthorized copying.11 Courts in this era echoed these
ideas, implicitly acknowledging that copyright was about balancing exclusivity
8 The seminal text of the school is The Legal Process. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT SACKS,
THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF THE LAW
(William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). For a historical overview of the school and
its texts, see William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to The
Legal Process, in HART & SACKS, supra, at li-cxxxvi [hereinafter Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction].
9 See John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1640,
1640 (2012) (explaining how private law “deﬁnes the rights and duties of individuals and private
entities as they relate to one another”); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1719 (1976) (”Private legal justice supposedly consists in the
respect for rights.”); Roscoe Pound, Public Law and Private Law, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 469, 471-74
(1939) (characterizing private law as law that “treat[s] all individuals as equal” and focuses on
restoring the individual to their position from before the legal wrong).
10 For a fuller discussion of this idea, see Ernest J. Weinrib, Private Law and Public Right, 61 U.
TORONTO L.J. 191, 192 (2011) (noting how, from a private law perspective, “arguments that seek to
have the law achieve goals external to the parties’ relationship . . . are all structurally inconsistent
with fair and coherent determinations of liability”).
11 Christopher Columbus Langdell, Patent Rights and Copy Rights, 12 HARV. L. REV. 553, 555 (1899).
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and use, as between plaintiff and defendant.12 Copyright law was thus, first and
foremost, a body of private law regulating a horizontal relationship. By the
middle of the twentieth century, this would change dramatically. One midtwentieth century Supreme Court opinion captured the shift most dramatically
when it unequivocally concluded that in copyright law the author’s benefit was
little more than a “secondary consideration,” less important than copyright’s
“public purpose.”13 The private interests at issue were, in other words, merely
in service of a public purpose, copyright’s “ultimate aim.”14
The roots of this fundamental transformation are to be found in
important developments in American legal thinking that took place after
World War II. While the Legal Realists of the 1930s and 1940s had succeeded
in debunking the claim that legal reasoning was an autonomous enterprise
wholly immune from politics,15 they had at the same time failed to propose a
constructive alternative in its place. The identiﬁcation of law as rampantly
indeterminate and driven by purely instrumental considerations seemed
grossly unsatisfying to many, especially in light of the events of the war.16 It
is in this climate that the Legal Process School emerged, principally in the
work of Lon Fuller, Henry Hart, and Albert Sacks, all professors at the
Harvard Law School.17 While acknowledging the instrumental nature of law,
12 See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249-52 (1903) (discussing
copyright in commercial advertisement pictorial illustrations); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v.
Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 61 (1884) (developing the idea that the author of the photograph was the person
who was the “eﬀective cause” for its existence); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1880) (developing
and reﬁning the exclusion of ideas and methods from copyright protection as a limit on the scope
of the plaintiﬀ ’s right).
13 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948).
14 See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (noting how the
“ultimate aim” of copyright was to “stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good”).
15 See Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 8, at lxvi-lxviii. For Legal Realist eﬀorts to
expose the myth of autonomous legal reasoning, see generally JEROME S. FRANK, LAW AND THE
MODERN MIND (1930); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935); Lon L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429 (1934);
Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence – The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930).
16 See Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 8, at lxvi (noting that “positivism’s separation
of law and morals” was heavily disfavored leading up to World War II); see also ROSCOE POUND,
CONTEMPORARY JURISTIC THEORY 10 (1940) (writing on the eve of World War II that “[o]ur faith
in” an objective judiciary “is futile”).
17 See generally LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964); HART & SACKS, supra note 8,
at 1-181; Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978). Of these,
The Legal Process is widely considered to be the classical work of the school. In addition to The Legal
Process, the other classic of this school was the work on federal courts by Henry Hart and Herbert
Wechsler. HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953). The literature on the Legal Process School is quite voluminous. For a
small sample, see Charles L. Barzun, The Forgotten Foundations of Hart and Sacks, 99 VA. L. REV. 1
(2013); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of The Legal Process, 107 HARV.
L. REV. 2031 (1994) [hereinafter Eskridge & Frickey, Making]; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on
the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953 (1994).
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the Legal Process School argued that the content of the law was to be
determined by the appropriate allocation of decisionmaking authority among
diﬀerent institutions, a principle it described as “institutional settlement.”18
Institutional settlement allowed the law to move seamlessly between the is
and the ought on different substantive questions, enabling it to grow organically,
while maintaining its rational edifice.19 Whether something was settled law was
seen as a question of who (i.e., which institution) had the authority to determine
it, in turn a product of whether that institution ought to be considered the right
one for the particular substantive question at issue. Institutional settlement
embodied a dynamic conception of law that consciously merged means and ends,
premised on the idea that law is a continuous “doing of something.”20 Such
allocation would facilitate each institution (within a legal area) to develop the
law in accordance with its own core competence, thereby enabling the law as a
whole to further its avowed goals, in turn identified based on such
competence.21 Institutional settlement therefore directly addressed the
indeterminacy of legal rules through a principled allocation of lawmaking
authority, which at once acknowledged the role of discretion while also
evidencing a strong commitment to the rule of law.
The Legal Process principle of “institutional settlement” had an
important prescriptive component to it. And this was the recognition that
while courts were principled decision-makers in the adjudicative setting, they
nonetheless had obvious limitations in their problem-solving and lawmaking
capacities.22 Congress was instead the “principal agent of change and policy
development” which it realized through statutes.23 Courts were to operate
within the interstices of congressional enactments and defer to other
institutions in a given area whenever needed. Law was therefore recognized
to be a “purposive” enterprise, with every legal doctrine embodying an
18 HART & SACKS, supra note 8, at 5.
19 LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 5-8

(1978); HART & SACKS, supra note 8,
at 4-6. In Fuller’s vision, which Hart and Sacks adopted, the merger of “is” and “ought” entailed
embracing the connection between law and morality, or the recognition that identifying what the
law is on a question always entails engaging the question of what it ought to be. Or, as Fuller himself
put it, the law embodied in a “statute or decision is not a segment of being, but . . . a process of
becoming.” FULLER, supra, at 10.
20 HART & SACKS, supra note 8, at 148.
21 Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 8, at xciii.
22 See Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 923
(2003) (noting that an awareness of these limitations was the “ﬁrst step” of the paradigm); Eskridge
& Frickey, Introduction, supra note 8, at lxxxiii (“[L]aw is not juricentric, and courts are part of a
larger institutional system . . . .”); Fallon, supra note 17, at 966 (noting how the theory limited the
judicial role to elaborating principles and policies “traceable to more democratically legitimate
decisionmakers”); Fuller, supra note 17, at 393-404 (explaining the limits of adjudication as a method
of lawmaking from within Legal Process).
23 Fallon, supra note 17, at 957-58.
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objective, and courts tasked with ascertaining that purpose and elaborating
on it.24 Implicit in this formulation of law as a purposive enterprise was the
belief that when it came to statutory regimes—areas of law created by
Congress through legislation—the purpose of the law was to be found in the
statute.25 The soundest “starting point” in identifying the policy of a legal
area was therefore the statute, which courts had to accept, elaborate on, or
supplement as needed in a purposive manner.26
Institutional settlement as such was, of course, far from suggesting a
mechanistic role for courts. All the same, it marked a genuine departure from
the prior Legal Realist accounts, which appeared perfectly ﬁne with
juricentric common law rule development wherein courts would bring their
own views of policy and purpose to bear on legal doctrine. In the Legal
Process School, courts were “valorize[ed]” for their strengths as principled
decisionmakers,27 with the simultaneous recognition that in important
respects those principles might be overridden by “policy preferences” better
delineated by other institutions.28 Principled (or reasoned) argument had its
limits and policymaking was therefore presumptively outside the natural
forte identiﬁed for courts,29 and was instead within the domain of Congress.

24 HART & SACKS, supra note 8, at 148.
25 The clearest statement of this idea is found

in the theory’s observation that a judge is always
“obliged” to relate the decision to the statute out of which the question arises, rather than to “think
of himself as in the same position as a legislator taking part in the enactment of the statute in the
ﬁrst place.” Id. at 143. This was central to the idea of “reasoned elaboration.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
26 Eskridge & Frickey, Making, supra note 17, at 2038. This idea does in reality predate Hart
and Sacks and can be traced to earlier scholars who had grown skeptical of the role of courts after
the successes of Legal Realism. Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 8, at lviii-lxii. This view
was most fervently held by Justice Felix Frankfurter, well known as a “patron saint” of the Legal
Process School on the Court. Brad Snyder, The Former Clerks Who Nearly Killed Judicial Restraint, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2129, 2133 (2014); see also Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 8, at
lxi. For Frankfurter’s insistence on restraint and deference to legislatures, see Felix Frankfurter, Some
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 533-34 (1947).
27 See ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 143-59 (1998)
(describing this trend and its conformity with institutional settlement).
28 Geoﬀrey C. Shaw, H.L.A. Hart’s Lost Essay: Discretion and the Legal Process School, 127 HARV.
L. REV. 666, 679 (2013); see also Edward L. Rubin, Legal Reasoning, Legal Process and the Judiciary as
an Institution, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 265, 278-79 (1997) (book review) (identifying the idea that courts
“should not make policy decisions” as a key facet of Legal Process); Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian
Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 217 (1983) (noting how Legal
Process “would counsel judges to leave all matters of substantive policy to the other more
representative branches”).
29 See Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of
Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1396 (1996) (“The particular task of courts . . . is to decide cases
on the basis of reasoned argument, and only issues that can be resolved by that approach are
appropriate for judicial resolution.”).
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A natural corollary to institutional settlement in the Legal Process
tradition was the theory’s faith in administrative agencies.30 Developed as it
was following the New Deal, the theory took the complexity of legal regimes
as an innate feature of the legal landscape, but was completely sanguine about
such complexity by empowering speciﬁc expert agencies to deal with it. In
particular, the theory augmented its account of judicial skepticism vis-à-vis
the legislature with the idea of judicial deference to administrative expertise,
well before this became an accepted interpretive method.31 This method was
seen to enhance the overall “eﬀectiveness” of a legal regime.32
The heyday of the Legal Process School, the 1950s and 1960s, coincided
with the call for a comprehensive revision of U.S. copyright law. In 1955,
Congress authorized a series of studies to document the problems that needed
to be addressed in a new statute.33 An overarching feature of these efforts was
the idea that it was Congress—empowered by the Constitution—that assumed
primary responsibility for delineating not just the content of copyright law,
but also its policies and purposes. The revision sought to convert into
legislation aspects of copyright doctrine that had been created by courts, and
in so doing gave effect to the idea that copyright’s commitment to “public
welfare” was something that Congress alone was best positioned to realize.34
Principles of copyright doctrine that had been developed through judicial
reasoning were now enshrined in a systematic exposition of the entire regime,
in an effort to introduce a degree of uniformity and coherence into the law
around an identified policy: promoting public welfare by inducing creativity.35
The comprehensive revision unfolded over the next two decades,
culminating in the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976. The new regime
that eventually resulted had at the end venerated several key tenets of the Legal
30 Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 8, at cxxxi.
31 HART & SACKS, supra note 8, at 1288-90. Indeed, the

book’s ﬁrst example is one where a
federal court defers to administrative expertise in an area, despite being inclined to go in a diﬀerent
direction. Id. at 57-58; see also Dorf, supra note 22, at 923 n.184 (discussing this example).
32 Id. at 151.
33 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE
GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW ix (1961) [hereinafter REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS 1961 REPORT].
34 See id. at 5 (observing that the “primary purpose” of copyright legislation is “to foster the
creation and dissemination of intellectual works for the public welfare”). The idea that Congress
alone had power can be traced back to the deliberations accompanying the 1909 Act, which the Report
quotes from with approval on the point that “Congress shall have the power to grant such rights if
it thinks best.” Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
35 See BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 40 (1967) (noting how the
1909 Act “leaves the development of fundamentals to the judges”); NIMMER, supra note 2, at vi
(describing how the 1976 Act consciously sought to depart from the judicial ﬂexibility of the prior
regimes); Litman, supra note 2, at 858-59 (discussing how some provisions of the 1976 Act
“purport[ed] to adopt common law doctrine” while “others purport[ed] to abrogate it.”); see also
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 129 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5745.
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Process School. First, it firmly entrenched the idea that Congress had a
dispositive say in the development of copyright policy (and when needed,
principles), constrained only by the vague directives of the Constitution. While
the idea had been latent in the buildup to the revision, the resulting regime
made it explicit.36 Not only was Congress’s say on copyright policy to be
definitive, but Congress was itself seen as the originator of such policy and free
to disregard, override, or modify prior policy or copyright principles.37 Second,
courts were to limit themselves to the “reasoned elaboration” of congressional
policy, as contained in the statutory scheme.38 Even when the statute vested
significant discretion in courts, they were to exercise this discretion in
accordance with the broader goals emanating from the scheme, in a principled
manner. No longer were courts seen as “partners” with Congress in this
enterprise.39 Judicially crafted copyright principles had to give way to
statutorily delineated policy, when an accommodation was impossible. Third,
the regime began to value greater deference to the expert body, the Copyright
Office, which had played a key role in the comprehensive revision. It became
standard practice to solicit and look to the Office’s views on the statute and
policy.40 What thus emerged was the idea of copyright law as a regime with
parts that needed to be “administered” using specialized expertise.41
Perhaps most importantly though, these structural shifts in the regime
produced a more far-reaching—but largely unnoticed—change in the
conception of law that copyright was. Given its emphasis on legislation, the
Legal Process School had succeeded in characterizing questions of statutory
interpretation and deference to expertise, regardless of the content of the
underlying area, as a matter of public law. Indeed, Legal Process has been
characterized as having set the “public law agenda” since its origins.42 In
36 REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 1961 REPORT, supra note 33, at 5 (quoting the legislative history
of the prior Act).
37 Litman, supra note 2, at 859 nn.16-17.
38 The Register of Copyright at the time described this as a “shift in direction for the very
philosophy of copyright itself.” Ringer, supra note 2, at 479; see also KAPLAN, supra note 35, at 41
(noting the problem of “a crowding of suggestive case law” under the prior Act); Litman, supra note
2, at 858 (noting the extensive role of courts under the prior Act and its reversal in the 1976 regime).
39 See Pierre N. Leval, An Assembly of Idiots, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1049, 1062 (2002) (describing
and lamenting this change).
40 For the ﬁrst attempt by the Supreme Court to do this, see Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 21112 (1954). By 2014, this had become common practice, such that the Register noted that the
“Copyright Oﬃce is aware that deference to its expert administrative authority turns upon . . . the
correlation . . . [of its] practices to the state of the law.” Maria A. Pallante, The Next Generation
Copyright Oﬃce: What it Means and Why it Matters, 61 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 213, 225 (2014).
41 See, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 568-69 (1973) (describing the Oﬃce as the
“agency empowered to administer the copyright statutes”); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS: FISCAL YEAR ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2012, at 3
(2013) (describing how the Oﬃce “administered the copyright law”).
42 Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 8, at lii.
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internalizing the structural lessons of the Legal Process School, copyright law
readily signed onto this agenda. Since then, copyright law and jurisprudence
have focused on the public administration of the statutory entitlement, one
whose goals and ideals were set and constrained through institutional
settlement. The regime’s focus shifted from the allocation of private rights
(and duties) to the allocation of decisionmaking power. And with this shift,
copyright law underwent a quiet metamorphosis into an area of public law.
The effects of this transformation have been pervasive and continue to be
felt in the copyright system to this day.43 By grafting public-focused,
institutional, and administrative ideals onto copyright’s basic framework of
right and liability, the new regime produced a veritable conflation of principle
and policy. Individual copyright rules and doctrines reveal little alignment
with the system’s overall avowed goal of incentivizing creativity.44 Courts—
including the Supreme Court—consider themselves powerless to secondguess Congress’s construction of the system’s goals and policies, both generally
and in individual cases.45 They instead make every effort to artificially align
copyright’s well-worn rules and principles with the regime’s overall policy as
manifested in the statute. Additionally, the system’s overall structural
complexity is seen as an innate feature of the system, and copyright reform
efforts seem perfectly willing to add to this complexity in multiple ways.46

43 Scholars have previously predicted and documented these changes. See, e.g., Joseph Liu,
Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 129-31 (2004); Peter Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law’s
Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 194 (2002). Menell presciently predicted that “Congress
will increasingly delegate authority to regulatory bodies and administrative
oﬃcials . . . . [C]opyright lawyers will need to learn a lot more about administrative law as this new
era unfolds.” Menell, supra, at 197. Liu’s account focuses on the complexity of the 1976 Act—in
contrast to prior regimes—to argue that modern copyright law has become “regulatory” in structure.
Liu, supra, at 90. While descriptively accurate, it simpliﬁes a variety of important conceptual
distinctions in characterizing the modern system as “regulatory.” It also altogether disregards the
possibility that the change in copyright law was produced by a broader transformation of the very
concept of law in America that occurred at the time and focuses entirely on factors internal and
unique to the copyright system. Liu, supra, at 129-31.
44 See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV.
1569, 1581-88 (2009) (documenting the mismatch between copyright’s avowed purposes and actual
doctrine); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1198 (1996)
(describing the gulf between copyright justiﬁcation and copyright doctrine).
45 See Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 324 (2012) (refusing to “second-guess the political choice
Congress made” in enacting copyright legislation); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 188 (2003)
(concluding that on the question of whether Congress “rational[ly] exercise[d]” its legislative power
it would “defer[] substantially to Congress”).
46 As examples, consider the Copyright Oﬃce’s report on a small claims court for copyright
disputes and its study on music licensing. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT AND THE
MUSIC MARKETPLACE 133 (2015) (providing analysis and recommendations); U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE, COPYRIGHT SMALL CLAIMS 92 (2013) (providing key ﬁndings and recommendations).
Both reports focus on legislative reform as their solutions to current problems.
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American copyright law is today better understood as a “legal process”
rather than just a body of legal rules, and this Article traces the intellectual
history of this transformation. The concept of law underlying copyright bears
the unmistakable imprint of the Legal Process School, wherein (a) the law is
continually attempting to identify and realize an external purpose, and (b) the
public institutional dynamics of law production are just as important as the
content of legal directives. Instead of fighting this reality, modern copyright
thinking would do well to acknowledge it and move to understanding just how
the legal-process features of the system might be better perfected and
rationalized through the lessons of Legal Process theory. At a minimum, this
will include: appreciating the working of the unstated “institutional
settlement” ideal within the system; articulating a coherent account of what
“reasoned elaboration” means for courts interpreting the copyright statute and
deferring to expertise in that exercise; and embracing the complexity of the
system by better managing it through the ideals of public administration. This,
in turn, is likely to generate the important realization that modern copyright
law is in a true sense a hybrid public–private system, wherein both public law
and private law ideals attempt to coexist in equilibrium, albeit a dynamic one.
The argument that follows proceeds in four Parts. Part I begins with a
brief description of the modern “public law” model of copyright that is today
seen in U.S. copyright law and jurisprudence. It shows how copyright is today
conceptualized as a private right that exists principally/only to further a
public purpose, characterized by a commitment to divided lawmaking and
interlaced with regulatory goals. Part II sets out the classical private law
conception of copyright law that existed through the middle of the twentieth
century, beginning with the era of Legal Formalism (or “classical legal
thought”47) and culminating in the heyday of Legal Realism. During this era,
copyright law and jurisprudence focused on the horizontal structure of the
copyright entitlement and emphasized the role of principle (over policy) in
the functioning of the system, which in turn recognized a central place for
judges in the overall skein. Part III then documents the Legal Process turn in
copyright jurisprudence that emerged post-World War II. It ﬁrst sets out the
central tenets of the Legal Process School and shows how several of its core
lessons came to be all too readily internalized by the emergent copyright
regime of the period. Having established the existence of this turn, Part IV
then moves to the prescriptive and brieﬂy shows how modern copyright
discourse might actively embrace this turn to rationalize its public law
elements through Legal Process thinking.
47 See DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 28 (2006)
(using the term “classical legal thought” to refer to legal thinking that “emerged between 1850 and
1885” and “ﬂourished between 1885 and 1935” but declined thereafter).
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I. AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW: PUBLIC LAW IN DISGUISE
As a way of classifying various areas of law, the distinction between the
domains of public law and private law is far from being analytically precise.
Indeed, the lack of such precision has over the years produced calls to abandon
the distinction altogether.48 Nonetheless, it captures important intuitions in
legal thinking and analysis—about the role of the state, collectivist (versus
individualist) ideals, and private action—that continue to exert inﬂuence.49
Distilled down to its basics, public law implies a direct and central role
for the state—as the protector of public welfare and public goals—in diﬀerent
aspects of the legal regime. This role can emerge in a variety of diﬀerent ways,
both structural and normative. Structurally, it has been seen to entail the state
taking a direct role in the enforcement of legal directives (criminal law),50 the
creation of vertical rights and duties between individuals and the government
(constitutional law),51 or the horizontal relationship between diﬀerent
branches of the government (administrative law).52 Normatively, it has come
to include situations where an area of law is structured and driven primarily
by the “public interest,” such that the resolution of private disputes is about
the vindication of public policy.53 This is in contrast to private law, wherein
the state plays an indirect role and the law focuses instead on the horizontal

48 See Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1349, 1349 (1982) (noting the “decline” of the public/private distinction); John Henry Merryman, The
Public Law-Private Law Distinction in European and American Law, 17 J. PUB. L. 3, 4 (1968) (“The public
law-private law distinction is not taken as seriously in the United States.”); Ralf Michaels & Nils Jansen,
Private Law Beyond the State? Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 843, 844
(2006) (identifying the frequent assumption that “all law is public law”); Pound, supra note 9, at 469
(“Public law . . . is gradually eating up private law.” (quoting William Ivor Jennings, The Institutional
Theory, in MODERN THEORIES OF LAW 68, 72 (Humphrey Milford ed., 1933)).
49 For uses of the distinction, see Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1282 (1976); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law
Movement: Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707, 790-91 (1991); Daniel
A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common Law in the Age of the New
Public Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 875, 876 (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of
Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1436 (1988).
50 See Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Private/Public Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423,
1424 (1982) (identifying criminal law as public law).
51 See id. (identifying constitutional law as public law).
52 See Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 614, 620 (1927)
[hereinafter Frankfurter, Administrative Law] (classifying administrative law as an area of public law).
53 See Chayes, supra note 49, at 1284 (identifying the rise of “public law litigation” in federal
court); George P. Fletcher, Remembering Gary—and Tort Theory, 50 UCLA L. REV. 279, 289 (2002)
(“[T]he resolution of private disputes is supposed to further the public interest.”); Leon Green, Tort
Law Public Law in Disguise, 38 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (1959) (emphasizing that courts do and should
consider the interests of “we the people” in adjudicating private disputes).
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relationship and interaction between private parties.54 Both structurally and
normatively, private law operates between private actors.
In its functioning, U.S. copyright law today manifests its public law
orientation in multiple ways, both normative and structural. The normative
dimension relates to the way in which the law’s purposes are understood,
constructed, and instantiated into individual doctrine, while the structural
relates to the substantive and institutional content of copyright doctrine.
Three key attributes of the contemporary copyright landscape highlight its
emergent public law orientation.
A. Private Right for a Public Purpose
The dominant justiﬁcation for U.S. copyright law today is utilitarian,
deriving from the language of the Copyright Clause of the Constitution.55 In
this understanding, “[t]he purpose of copyright is to create incentives for
creative eﬀort.”56 All the same, such individual creative eﬀort is worthwhile
only because it inures to the overall public beneﬁt, or as one court put it, “The
economic philosophy behind . . . copyright[] is the conviction that
encouragement of individual eﬀort by personal gain is the best way to advance
public welfare . . . .”57 Individual creative activity is seen as worthy of
encouragement for its role in advancing public welfare. This public-regarding
utilitarian logic therefore recognizes the existence of a causal and hierarchical
relationship between the generation of a private beneﬁt and the enhancement
of overall public welfare. Copyright jurisprudence regards the private beneﬁt
the law produces as a “secondary consideration,”58 while the beneﬁts to the
public form its “primary object.”59 Discussions of the modern copyright
system today underscore this utilitarian, public-oriented logic, giving it the
aura of an uncontested dogma.60

54 Chayes, supra note 49, at 1282-83.
55 See U.S. CONST., art I, § 8, cl. 1, 8 (“Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress

of Science and useful Arts, by securing . . . to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”).
56 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 (1984).
57 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (emphasis added).
58 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948).
59 Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
60 See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 429 (noting that in copyright “the limited grant is a means by
which an important public purpose may be achieved”); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,
422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“[P]rivate motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad
public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.”); NEIL W. NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S
PARADOX 81-84 (2008) (describing modern copyright law as an “engine of free expression”). For an
argument that copyright law is not utilitarian enough, see Sara K. Stadler, Forging a Truly Utilitarian
Copyright, 91 IOWA L. REV. 609 (2006).
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As understood in this justiﬁcation, the private interests of the parties
directly aﬀected by the copyright system—authors, owners, and potential
copiers—are little more than the means identiﬁed by Congress (via the
Constitution) to realize an ultimate end. These private interests have, to
copyright, no independent justiﬁcation beyond the overall public-regarding
purpose that they serve in enhancing the public welfare.61 The end justiﬁes
the means, which has no separate reason for existence. Modern copyright’s
normative orientation is therefore collectivist, public-focused, and associated
with a clear policy goal: inducing greater creativity through a private beneﬁt
at minimal social cost, for the beneﬁt of the public. A direct consequence of
modern copyright’s focus on its public welfare policy has been that its internal
doctrinal mechanisms— its rules, concepts, and principles—have assumed a
secondary status to the overall collectivist goal. In other words, when there is
a conﬂict between this external policy and the internal rules and principles of
copyright, the latter is understood as needing to accommodate the former and
not vice-versa. Copyright’s internal logic is thus dependent on its overall
collectivist policy.
The normative supremacy of copyright’s public welfare policy is more
than just of rhetorical signiﬁcance. To the contrary, it actually impacts the
way in which courts adjudicating copyright disputes prioritize policy
considerations, which are invariably collectivist in orientation, over those
deriving from principles relating to individual rights and liability. Established
principles of copyright, such as the fact-expression distinction (i.e., the
exclusion of facts from protection),62 the merger doctrine,63 originality,64 or
the use of a “reasonable observer”65 standard for the infringement analysis are
routinely recast (artiﬁcially) as emanating from copyright’s overall policy goal
determined for it by Congress, and having little independent salience on their
own. Even independent of such recasting, courts make reference to
copyright’s “policy” commitment to the “common good” when attempting to

61 See ABRAHAM DRASSINOWER, WHAT’S WRONG WITH COPYING? 17-19 (2015) (noting the
limitations of this approach); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure of Copyright:
Unbundling the Wrong of Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1664, 1664 (2012) (criticizing this trend).
62 See, e.g., Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1542 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that the exclusion of
facts from protection “do[es] not come straight from ﬁrst principles” but is instead a policy).
63 See, e.g., CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 73 (2d
Cir. 1994) (ﬁnding that “a withholding of the merger doctrine would not seriously impair the policy
of the copyright law . . . .”).
64 See id. at 66 (noting that “there is no reason under the policies of the copyright law to demand
a high degree of originality”); DRASSINOWER, supra note 61, at 17-19.
65 See Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 733 (4th Cir. 1990) (concluding that “the
policy underlying the ordinary observer test requires a recognition of the limits of the ordinary lay
observer characterization of the ordinary observer test”).
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resolve conﬂicts between competing principles in individual cases.66 The ideal
of overall public welfare therefore looms large in the actual functioning of
modern copyright law, even in individual cases.
In relying on the private enforcement (of individual rights) to realize its
public-regarding (collectivist) goals, copyright is of course in good company.
Decades ago, tort scholars identiﬁed a similar change in discourse within tort
law, which they characterized as tort law’s move to “public law.”67 The shift
from a singular focus on the rights and duties of the parties involved in a
dispute to the overall public policy sought to be realized in the enforcement
of the law at hand was central to this characterization. A similar trend was
seen in contract law, which scholars treated as a conferral of public power to
individuals, which “could be justiﬁed only by public purposes.”68 More
recently, political scientists have come to see this structure as a conscious
design choice deployed by Congress in diﬀerent contexts.69 By creating a set
of private rights and setting up an incentive mechanism for private actors to
enforce those rights, Congress realizes several of its overall (public) policy
goals through a cost-eﬀective and politically expedient mechanism: private
litigation to vindicate public values.70 Implicit in such deliberate design is the
recognition that the regime so created is indelibly a form of public law, given
the omnipresence of Congress’s ultimate aim.
Given the rhetorical, analytical, and justiﬁcatory primacy of copyright’s
overall public welfare goal, the modern copyright statute might therefore well
be understood as representing a similar mechanism wherein Congress is
attempting to realize a public goal (of generating creative expression at
minimal cost) through the creation of private incentives and beneﬁts. As an
analogy, consider a situation wherein a legislative body decides that
automobile accidents are bad for society (owing to some public-oriented
reason) and develops a mechanism to deter such accidents through the
creation of a private action for an individual harmed by an accident to recover.

66 CCC Info. Servs., 44 F.3d at 66.
67 For an account of tort law’s public

law shift, see generally Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law
in Disguise, 38 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1959); Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise-II, 38 TEX. L.
REV. 257 (1960). For arguments in favor of this public law shift, see generally David Rosenberg, The
Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV.
849 (1984). For doubts about this shift and its “surrender [of] the individual to the demands of ”
public welfare, see George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 53740, 556-73 (1972).
68 Horwitz, supra note 50, at 1426; see also id. (describing this trend in the 1930s and 1940s).
69 See, e.g., SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 3 (2010) (asserting that Congress makes “a legislative choice to rely upon
private litigation in statutory implementation”); ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM:
THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE 3 (2001) (deﬁning this phenomenon as “adversarial legalism”).
70 FARHANG, supra note 69, at 3-5.
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In this model, it certainly would be the case that individuals who suﬀer harm
(from accidents) recover and are beneﬁted privately, yet the system is selfconsciously not about individual plaintiﬀs and defendants—whom it treats as
a means to an end—and necessarily contingent on the overall enterprise of
“social engineer[ing].”71 To put the point most bluntly, if the legislature were
to one day decide that there is in fact a better and more eﬀective way to realize
the same policy goal (of reducing accidents—e.g., criminal law), it would ﬁnd
little reason to hold on to the model of private liability for accidents.72
And so it is with copyright law too, in the modern understanding.
Copyright’s private liability apparatus and the principles undergirding it are
seen as entirely subsidiary to the primary ideal of promoting overall creativity
and enhancing the public welfare. The means identiﬁed are unquestionably
secondary to the primacy of the end.
B. Market Regulation as a Goal
The modern copyright system’s logic of focusing on the public interest
(i.e., public welfare) as its normative goal finds further instantiation in the
manner in which the system is actually structured. Instead of just focusing on
the provision of an inducement to create and ensuring that creative expression
is indeed generated as a result of such inducement, current copyright law goes
significantly further by constructing the very terms of the market for
expression so produced, in certain domains. Consider in this regard the reality
that after setting out the subject matter that can obtain protection and the
scope of such protection through its delineation of exclusive rights, the
copyright statute recognizes that for various categories of protected subject
matter, market transactions need further regulation and facilitation.73
Consequently, in a variety of contexts, the statute sets up comprehensive
systems of “compulsory” and “statutory” licensing schemes, under which a
user of the work is allowed to use a protected work upon the payment of a

71 See Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer as a Social Engineer, 3 J. PUB. L. 292, 292 (1954) (deﬁning
“social engineer[ing]” as the activity of making a social process realize its purpose with “a minimum
of friction and waste”).
72 Indeed, this was the argument of two prominent tort scholars. See Walter J. Blum & Harry
Kalven, Jr., Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem—Auto Compensation Plans, 31 U. CHI. L.
REV. 641, 723 (1964) (oﬀering a similar argument and concluding that “[p]rivate law cannot borrow
goals from public law ﬁelds without accepting the obligation to make a proper public law analysis”).
73 See 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2018) (addressing secondary transmissions); 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2018) (sound
recordings); 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2018) (nondramatic musical works); 17 U.S.C. § 116 (2018) (coinoperated phonorecord players); 17 U.S.C. § 118 (2018) (noncommercial broadcasting); 17 U.S.C. §
119 (2018) (distant television programming by satellite); 17 U.S.C. § 122 (2018) (local television
programming by satellite).
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determined royalty.74 These licensing schemes delineate the conditions that
must be met for parties to invoke them, the scope of the license obtained, and
in addition the manner in which the royalty is to be computed.75 As if this
were not enough, the statute even creates a specialized body—the Copyright
Royalty Tribunal—under the authority of the Copyright Oﬃce, and vests it
with power to determine fair royalties for various licensing schemes.76 Not
only are these mechanisms detailed and complex, but they are also highly
tailored and speciﬁc to particular industries and at times even sub-groups
within industries, reﬂective of the industry-level compromises that came to
be reﬂected in the 1976 Act.77
Scholars have previously documented this regulatory turn in the 1976 Act
and in modifications to it since. Indeed, some have even predicted that this
approach would continue to dominate copyright lawmaking in the years to come.
In very prescient terms, Peter Menell noted how copyright had effectively
become a “regulatory regime” and compared it to the evolution of environmental
regulation, where government controls in the marketplace in pursuit of a
collective goal had become the norm.78 Joseph Liu has similarly described this
post-1976 turn in copyright law as the move towards a form of “regulatory
copyright.”79 Regulatory copyright is characterized by its complexity and detail,
industry-specific rules, and unique institutional features.80
What it also reveals, however, is the injection of additional policy goals
into the working of the copyright system, beyond the ideal of enhancing
public welfare through the production of creative expression, all under the
rubric of regulating the market for creative expression. These include policies
relating to: the ideal industry-structure in certain creative domains (industrial
policy);81 the role of copyright in fostering innovative means of

74 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2018) (statutory licensing scheme for secondary transmissions by
cable systems); 17 U.S.C. § 114 (2018) (same for sound recordings); 17 U.S.C. § 116 (2018) (same for
coin-operated phonorecord players).
75 Id.
76 17 U.S.C. § 801 (2018).
77 For a full account of these compromises and their translation into legislative provisions, see
Litman, supra note 2, at 870-79.
78 Menell, supra note 43, at 194-97.
79 Liu, supra note 43, at 102-03.
80 Id. at 103-05.
81 For a discussion of industry structure, product diﬀerentiation, and entry, see Randal C.
Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 423, 423-25
(2002); Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Diﬀerentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 220-25
(2004); see also PETER BALDWIN, THE COPYRIGHT WARS: THREE CENTURIES OF TRANSATLANTIC BATTLE 17 (2016) (noting how American copyright law is perceived as being an
instrument of “industrial policy”).
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communication (communications policy);82 and the copyright system’s
support for digital self-help technologies (digital rights management
(“DRM”) policy),83 just to name a few.
Going back to our automobile accident analogy, the modern copyright
regime is therefore analogous to one where Congress decides not just to
institute a form of private liability for accidents, but also further (i)
determines the actual rules that drivers must follow to avoid such liability;
(ii) mandates a system of insurance for compensation; (iii) speciﬁes how such
insurance should be obtained; and also (iv) creates a body to determine
insurance payouts when an accident occurs. A regime such as this could quite
justiﬁably be characterized as a regime of “public law” accident regulation,
rather than a regime of tort law.84
Beyond its structural component, the modern copyright regime’s growing
focus on regulating the market for creative expression also introduces new
normative goals into the functioning of the system. Those goals originate in
the very ideal of “regulation” and encompass both economic and noneconomic
considerations. Notably, all of the considerations are driven by a conception
of the “public interest,” which in turn self-consciously adopts a collectivist
stance.85 The regulation of the market for creative expression is therefore a
presumptively public goal—seeking to serve the collective interests of creators,
copiers, and the general public.
C. Divided (and Coordinated) Lawmaking
A third feature of the modern public law model of copyright is structural
and originates in its presumptive adherence to the constitutional ideal of
“separation of powers.”86 The modern copyright system is characterized by a
82 For an account of copyright’s communications policy and its development, see generally
Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278 (2004).
83 For more about the intersection of DRM and copyright, see Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual
Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 537-46 (1999) (criticizing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s anticircumvention rules); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Communications’ Copyright Policy, 4 J. TELECOMM.
& HIGH TECH. L. 97, 99, 105-13 (2005) (discussing the benefits of DRM for “good copyright policy”).
84 See Blum & Kalven, supra note 72, at 642-46 (characterizing such a regime as an “auto[mobile]
compensation plan”).
85 For prominent accounts of regulation and the role of public interest therein, see STEPHEN
BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 22-25 (1982); MIKE FEINTUCK, ‘THE PUBLIC
INTEREST’ IN REGULATION 35 (2004); Michael Hantke-Domas, The Public Interest Theory of
Regulation: Non-Existence or Misinterpretation?, 15 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 165, 172-78 (2003); Sidney A.
Shapiro, Keeping the Baby and Throwing out the Bathwater: Justice Breyer's Critique of Regulation, 8
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 721, 734 (1995).
86 For overviews of U.S. separation of powers doctrine and its precepts, see John F. Manning,
Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1950-71 (2011), which discusses
the modern U.S. approach to separation of powers, and Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of
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division of lawmaking authority among diﬀerent institutional bodies within
the system. As copyright thinking came to be infused with collectivist ideals
and regulatory goals, the complexity that it generated was seen to necessitate
a division of responsibility among diﬀerent institutions, each of which
emphasizes a diﬀerent aspect of the public interest.87 This trend continues
unabated to this day. While this division of authority produces an obvious
fragmentation in the regime’s conception of law, it has also necessitated the
development of mechanisms of interbranch coordination for the regime to
function, or rules of administrative copyright law.
The public law model assumes the supremacy of Congress in the realm of
copyright lawmaking.88 While Congress has always been formally responsible
for the blackletter of copyright law (i.e., the statute), the modern trend has
seen Congress reassert its lawmaking role in the copyright domain, by
attempting to weigh in—albeit imperfectly—on most aspects of copyright
doctrine.89 Courts, for their part, have moderated their own lawmaking role
accordingly, to give effect to this trend and thereby acknowledged the reality
that Congress may be better suited to ascertaining the “public interest” and
giving effect to the balancing that it necessitates.90 Beginning with Justice
Brandeis’ infamous recognition that “[c]ourts are ill-equipped” to make public
interest determinations in the realm of intellectual property law, and that they
are “powerless” to construct the machinery and regulations needed to make
such considerations real,91 courts in the public law model approach copyright

Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 640 (2000), which identiﬁes the purported goals of U.S. separation
of powers doctrine as the protection and promotion of democracy, professional competence and
fundamental rights.
87 See generally Robert E. Goodin, Institutionalizing the Public Interest: The Defense of Deadlock and
Beyond, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 331 (1996) (discussing the connection between the public interest
and divided lawmaking).
88 This is unexceptional in light of the Constitution’s express grant of copyright lawmaking
authority, under Article I, to Congress. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Nothing about this constitutional
provision has changed since the founding era, yet under the public law model it has come to be given
an unequivocal reading that favors congressional supremacy in the area. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcoft, 537
U.S. 186, 208 (2003) (“[W]e are not at liberty to second-guess congressional determinations and policy
judgments of this order, however debatable or arguably unwise they may be.”).
89 See Christopher S. Yoo, The Impact of Codification on the Judicial Development of Copyright, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 177, 177 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013)
(“[M]odern copyright has been widely acknowledged to be statutory in nature.”).
90 See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 335 (2012) (concluding that “[t]he
judgment . . . expresse[d by Congress in the statute] lies well within the ken of the political
branches” and that the Court’s only “obligation, of course, [is] to determine whether the action
Congress took, wise or not, encounters any constitutional shoal”); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 208 (refusing
“to second-guess congressional determinations”).
91 Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 267 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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adjudication as primarily and overtly an exercise in statutory interpretation.92
Copyright’s collectivist ideals are presumptively congressionally determined,
and taken to lie within (or behind) the terms of the copyright statute. Even
when developing the law as a matter of first impression, they strive to render
their reasoning compatible with Congress’s presumptive grand plan for the
public welfare, as supposedly captured in the copyright statute.93
Beyond recalibrating the legislative-judicial dynamic, the public law model
of copyright also places unprecedented faith in the role of an expert agency—
the Copyright Office—to guide both Congress and the courts on matters of
copyright.94 The Office is vested with a variety of functions under the
statute,95 in the exercise of which it regularly intervenes as an expert agency
in major court cases,96 engages in administrative rulemaking exercises,97 and
perhaps most importantly, interprets and supplements statutes and case law
on important doctrinal questions of copyright law, a practice that has received
the tacit approval of courts and Congress.98 This last practice is particularly
important to appreciate, since it operates today as an independent—and
significantly persuasive—formal source of copyright law.99 Coupled with the
92 See, e.g., Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 530 (2013) (relying on statutory
“language,” “context,” and “common-law history” to interpret a provision, instead of policy
considerations). But see Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Gideon Parchomovsky, Equity's Unstated
Domain: The Role of Equity in Shaping Copyright Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1859, 1860-61 (2015) (arguing
that even with this approach, courts have relied on mechanisms of discretion to increase their role).
93 For a prominent example, see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). While
the Court developed the “transformative use” doctrine variant of fair use in common law fashion in
Campbell, it nonetheless emphasized the need to render its reasoning compatible with the four fair use
factors contained in § 107 of the copyright statute. Id. at 578-94; see also ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 573
U.S. 431, 438-45 (2014) (approaching the question of whether a new technology is a public performance
under the law as entirely a matter of presumptive congressional intent and policy).
94 17 U.S.C. § 701 (2018).
95 Id. § 701(b).
96 See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Star
Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017) (No. 15-866), 2016 WL 5116853; Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S.
431 (2014) (No. 13-461), 2014 WL 828079; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04480), 2005 WL 154148.
97 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 702 (2018) (vesting the power to make regulations with the Copyright
Oﬃce); 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2018) (vesting rulemaking power under the DMCA with the
Copyright Oﬃce). For an example of a rule made under these powers, see 37 C.F.R. § 201.4 (2020)
(prescribing requirements for the recordations of copyright ownership transfers).
98 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM, supra note 5, at 2 (“Courts have cited the
Compendium in numerous copyright cases.”); id. § 101.1 (“[The Oﬃce] provides expert subject matter
assistance to Congress on copyright policy and interpretation of the copyright law . . . .”).
99 For cases placing express reliance on the Compendium, see Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star
Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 480 (6th Cir. 2015); Olem Shoe Corp. v. Washington Shoe Corp., 591
F. App’x 873, 882 n.10 (11th Cir. 2015); Batjac Prods. Inc. v. GoodTimes Home Video Corp., 160
F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 1998).
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crucial role that the Office plays in registering individual works,100 its
interpretation of copyright doctrine assumes a level of everyday importance
to the functioning of the copyright system that is often underappreciated.
The net eﬀect of the public law model’s institutional dynamic of
separation of powers is that approaching any question of copyright law now
requires an account of the interaction and coordination between these
diﬀerent lawmaking branches, in order to understand an issue. The public
law-based rules of engagement between these agencies on issues of copyright
law101 have thereby become an integral part of the landscape of copyright law.
***
In its (i) emphasis on collectivist public welfare over private right, (ii)
attempt to regulate the marketplace for creative expression, and (iii) use of a
disaggregated framework of lawmaking, modern copyright law thus embodies a
strong public law dimension to its functioning, one that is rarely acknowledged.
The public law orientation of modern copyright exerts a signiﬁcant—but
unappreciated—inﬂuence on the working of the system, its selfunderstanding of its goals, and the public’s perception of its successes and
failures. It contributes to the extensive confusion that permeates copyright’s
justiﬁcatory debates by injecting a new set of public-regarding ideas and
variables into the conversation, all of which are routinely seen to be in
opposition to—rather than compatible with—copyright’s private beneﬁts.102
In the process, the goal of a “balance” between the public and private thus
emerges as central.103 Additionally, the complexity underlying the regulatory
landscape of public law copyright endorses the view that copyright law is to
be understood as an autonomous body of law. Copyright law expertise is today
seen as independent from general legal/administrative expertise.
The U.S. public law conception of copyright is of modern vintage, and
something of an outlier in the global copyright system. It is, however, the
product of important changes in general legal thinking and analysis that
occurred in America over the course of the last century, and which came to
inﬂuence the copyright discourse as well. Examining the process through
which this occurred sheds important light on what exactly this complicated
and seemingly sprawling public law framework for copyright is intended to
100 17 U.S.C. § 408 (2018).
101 See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 30 (1985)

(describing the purpose of administrative law as relating to the behavior of public oﬃcials).
102 See ISABELLA ALEXANDER, COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 3-4 (2010) (discussing this general oppositional stance).
103 Id. at 1-2; see also Peter B. Maggs, The Balance of Copyright in the United States of America, 58
AM. J. COMP. L. 369, 371 (2010).
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realize, and how its functioning might be better appreciated and reﬁned. It is
to this task that the next two Parts turn.
II. THE PRIVATE LAW CONCEPTION OF COPYRIGHT
Through most of its history American copyright law adopted a relatively
straightforward understanding of its functioning, premised on its structure as
a private right directed at governing the horizontal interaction between
creators and copiers through a regime of civil liability. In this private law
conception, copyright law and reasoning came to focus on governing the
rights of creators, the correlative duties of potential copiers, the wrongdoing
that a breach of these duties entailed, and the various immunities and
defenses that copiers could avail themselves of. The law therefore emphasized
its governance of the legal relationship between copyright plaintiﬀ (creator)
and copyright defendant (copier) and derived its normative ideals from
within the contours of that relationship.
Put in slightly more abstract terms, the analytical focus of the private law
conception was its reliance on criteria internal to copyright for its analysis
and reasoning. Often characterized as the distinction between “principles”
and “policy,” the contrast between the two is well documented in the
literature.104 A policy refers to an external “goal to be reached” through the
use of a rule or doctrine and treats the law in avowedly instrumental terms
(e.g., the goal of reducing automobile accidents through a liability regime).105
Arguments from policy are most commonly collectivist in orientation.106 By
contrast, a principle refers to a norm that mandates something based on
considerations of “justice or fairness” that make no appeal to external criteria
(e.g., preventing a wrongdoer from beneﬁting from the wrongdoing) but are
instead taken to be embedded within the law itself.107 Principle-based
arguments are usually couched as arguments of “right.”108 An argument from
welfare is the archetypical policy-based reason, while one based on equality
is a paradigmatic principle-driven one. The private law conception of

104 The classical account is that of Dworkin. See Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U.
CHI. L. REV. 14, 23 (1967) [hereinafter Dworkin, Model of Rules]; see also RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 82-84 (1977) [hereinafter DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY].
For a broad overview and analysis of Dworkin’s account, see generally Donald H. Regan, Glosses on
Dworkin: Rights, Principles, and Policies, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1213 (1978).
105 Dworkin, Model of Rules, supra note 104, at 23.
106 DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 104, at 82 (noting how arguments of
policy focus on showing that the decision “advances or protects some collective goals of the
community as a whole”)
107 Dworkin, Model of Rules, supra note 104, at 23.
108 DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 104, at 82.
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copyright revealed an unabashed emphasis on the internal logic of copyright,
and thereby extolled the search for copyright principles.
The private law conception manifested itself in copyright jurisprudence
and reasoning in three distinctive ways. First, it treated copyright as an
individual right, vested in the author and with correlative obligations (duties)
imposed on others. Very importantly, this emphasis was more than just
rhetorical. Adjudicating copyright cases entailed an explication of the
regime’s myriad doctrines through the use of the right-duty structure. In so
doing, such explication routinely gave doctrines a rationale that appeared selfevident, naturalistic, and on occasion immanent109 (i.e., internal).
Second, to the extent that copyright’s purpose was ever discussed in the
jurisprudence, it was seen as always connected to the right-duty structure of
copyright. Courts and scholars treated copyright’s goals as either embedded
within the institution’s right-duty structure, or instead as flowing normatively
therefrom. Rarely ever was copyright’s public-regarding purpose seen as
independently defensible in a manner that rendered its doctrinal apparatus
wholly contingent; the interests of the plaintiff and defendant thus informed—
and constrained—the construction of copyright’s purposes in the discourse.
Third, the judicial development of copyright doctrine focused very little
on locating a legislative intent—either actual or implied—to answer a
question directly, despite acknowledging the statutory basis for copyright (an
exception was of course when the issue itself was purely interpretive in
nature). Courts and scholars focused instead on deciding copyright cases
using precedent-based “principles” that they developed and declared, or by
focusing on the unique factual speciﬁcities of a case, which they used to
expound the doctrine.110 This certainly did not mean that they ignored the
statute altogether—just that they showed it little deference. This
underemphasis on legislation had both an institutional and a substantive
implication. Institutionally, it validated the role of courts as active lawmakers
in the ﬁeld, who policed copyright doctrine through principles and factspeciﬁc determinations; substantively, it enabled courts to embrace
transsubstantivity in their willingness to treat copyright law as connected to

109 See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Immanent Rationality of Copyright Law, 115 MICH.
L. REV. 1047 (2017) (book review) (discussing the merits and downsides of such an approach to
copyright); Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949
(1988) (deﬁning and defending an immanent approach to legal analysis).
110 See Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 601, 613-21 (1993) (discussing the centrality of principles in legal reasoning across
diﬀerent schools of American legal thought).
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other areas of the law and capable of drawing therefrom, rather than as a
hermetically sealed area.111
While some elements of the private law conception of copyright law
emerged in the decades immediately following the enactment of the ﬁrst
copyright statute in the U.S., it crystallized during the era of classical legal
thought (or Legal Formalism), which developed its own distinctive legal
consciousness by the last quarter of the nineteenth century.112 The same
conception of copyright then continued to hold sway through the era of Legal
Realism, an approach that emerged as a reaction to Legal Formalism and
dominated American legal thinking beginning in the second third of the
twentieth century.113 The discussion below is therefore isolated into two
sequential phases, even though both embodied a largely similar conception of
copyright law.
A. Classical-Era Copyright Law
Following the Civil War, American legal thinking came to develop a
unique conception of law and legal institutions, one that is commonly (albeit
pejoratively) referred to as “Legal Formalism.”114 Central to the consciousness
underlying Legal Formalism was the idea that law was capable of being
understood as an autonomous enterprise, independent in large (even if not all)
measure from political power, social goals, and economic considerations.115
Most accounts of Legal Formalism are usually associated with the legal
theory of Christopher Columbus Langdell, a law professor and ﬁrst dean of
the Harvard Law School.116 Indeed, it is occasionally referred to as

111 For a general discussion of inter-doctrinal borrowing, see Edward Rock & Michael
Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust Law, and Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, 96 NW.
U. L. REV. 651 (2002).
112 See KENNEDY, supra note 47, at 27 (deﬁning “legal consciousness” as “the particular form of
consciousness that characterizes the legal profession as a social group, at a particular moment”).
113 See L. L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429, 429 (1934) (noting that
Legal Realism reached its heyday around 1929).
114 For accounts of the emergence of formalism post–Civil War, see MORTON J. HORWITZ,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY
9-10 (1992); Morton J. Horwitz, The Rise of Legal Formalism, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 251, 251-54
(1975). For characterizations of Legal Formalism, see GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN
LAW 62 (1977); Daniel Farber, The Ages of American Formalism, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 89, 92-93 (1995);
Charles C. Goetsch, The Future of Legal Formalism, 24 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 221, 221 (1980).
115 GILMORE, supra note 114, at 62; HORWITZ, supra note 114, at 14-16; KENNEDY, supra note
47, at 2-3.
116 See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 114, at 128-29; BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE
FORMALIST–REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING 51-52 (2009); R. Blake Brown
& Bruce A. Kimball, When Holmes Borrowed from Langdell: The “Ultra Legal” Formalism and Public
Policy of Northern Securities (1904), 45 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 278, 278 (2001); Patrick J. Kelley, Holmes,
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“Langdellianism,” given that Langdell’s approach epitomized almost all of the
core attributes of Formalism.117 In his seminal work on Langdell’s theory, Tom
Grey notes that the core of the theory lay in the idea that “law is a science.”118
Grey argues that formalization, conceptual ordering, and the identiﬁcation of
core principles were essential features of the approach, which operated on the
enduring assumption that individual rules could be “derived” or “deduced”
from these principles.119 Overarching and open-ended considerations such as
“justice and policy” were of relevance only insofar as they were embodied
within principles that were capable of precise exposition and application.120
In the Legal Formalist—or Classical—understanding, maintaining the
divide between private law and public law was crucial.121 Whereas private law
could be conceptually ordered in their “scientiﬁc” way and organized around
abstract principles and categories, public law was seen as overtly political,
“unscientiﬁc,” and “hopelessly vague.”122 The private law subjects of property,
contract, and tort, all of common law origin, were treated as deﬁning the very
content of the law and capable of being rationalized through the development
of legal principles articulated, developed, and applied by courts in individual
cases. Scholars have argued that this emphasis on private law was a product
of the Formalists’ attempt to protect the ideology of the individualist market
and maintain the status quo, which favored business and commercial interests
over collectivist ideals.123 Whether this actually occurred as an empirical
matter or not,124 as an analytical matter Formalist analysis of legal doctrine
certainly held collectivist and public-regarding ideals at bay in the
development and reﬁnement of doctrine.
The Legal Formalist affinity for private law also caused them to develop a
deep discomfort with legislation, which they saw as “haphazard.”125 Indeed, to
Langdell the term “law” did not cover legislation, but was limited to “law as
administered by courts of justice” in individual cases.126 The common law was
Langdell and Formalism, 15 RATIO JURIS 26, 26 (2002); Bruce A. Kimball, Langdell on Contracts and
Legal Reasoning: Correcting the Holmesian Caricature, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 345, 345-47 (2007).
117 See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 11 (1995); Anthony
Kronman, Jurisprudential Responses to Legal Realism, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 335, 335 (1987).
118 Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 5 (1983).
119 Id. at 6-11.
120 Id. at 14-15.
121 Id. at 47-48; see also HORWITZ, supra note 114, at 10-11.
122 Grey, supra note 118, at 34.
123 Id. at 33; see also HORWITZ, supra note 114, at 4-5.
124 See Grey, supra note 118, at 34 (expressing doubt over the pro-business orientation of actual
judicial decisions in this period).
125 Id. at 34.
126 Christopher Columbus Langdell, Dominant Opinions in England During the Nineteenth
Century in Relation to Legislation as Illustrated by English Legislation, or the Absence of It, During That
Period, 19 HARV. L. REV. 151, 151 (1906).
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therefore structurally and normatively superior to legislation, given its ability to
be rationalized through principles and categorized as such. When actually forced
to grapple with the text of a statute, i.e., when the question itself was clearly
covered by a provision, Formalists tended to be textualist in their approach,
eschewing any effort to understand the purpose/policy behind the statute.127
Classical-era Legal Formalism therefore exhibited a distinct preference
for principle over policy, for judge-made law over statutes, and for private law
over public law. Much of this translated into the copyright setting, but with
some important modiﬁcations. Copyright is—and has always been—statutory
in origin. The ﬁrst Copyright Act was enacted in 1790, amended a few
times,128 and then comprehensively revised in 1831 and 1870.129 Thus by the
advent of the Classical era, there was little doubt that copyright was statutory
as a matter of formal origin. Nevertheless, the conception of copyright in this
era maintained its adherence to the overall Formalist credo, while
acknowledging the statutory origin of the institution. We see this not just in
the writings of scholars and treatise authors, but also in judicial formulations
of copyright questions and disputes during the period.
Writing in 1899, Langdell himself attempted to develop a private law
account of copyright, which showcases the dominant Formalist approach of
the time.130 An author’s right in his creation, to Langdell, was not a right
conferred by the state, but instead a right “recognize[ed] and protect[ed]” by
the state.131 The right—a “personal right”—had to be distinguished from a
property right in the embodiment of the creation and was instead a right in
the creation “regarded as an incorporeal thing,” which furnished the author
with an “eﬀective means of preventing the use and enjoyment of his
creation . . . by others without his consent.”132 The source of the right was not
the state, “but is deduced as a consequence of the creation.”133 The logic of
copyright was thus to be found internal to the activity that formed the subject
of the regime, i.e., creation. Crucially, the source of this logic was not the
statute nor the mere idea of property, but instead taken to be “well settled by
authority” and “clear upon principle.”134 That the act of creation ipso facto
127 See Christopher Columbus Langdell, The Northern Securities Case and the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act, 16 HARV. L. REV. 539, 551 (1903) (noting that “a lawgiver is supposed to mean only what he
says” in the context of the Sherman Act).
128 See Act of May 31, 1790, Pub. L. No. 1-15, 1 Stat. 124.
129 See Patent Act of 1870, Pub. L. No. 41-230, 16 Stat. 198 (revising the statutes related to
patents and copyright); An Act to Amend the Several Acts Respecting Copyrights, Pub. L. No. 2116, § 14, 4 Stat. 436, 439 (1831) (repealing the Act of May 31, 1790).
130 Langdell, supra note 11.
131 Id. at 553.
132 Id. at 553 n.2, 554.
133 Id. at 554.
134 Id.
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could give rise to an exclusive right in the intangible matter underlying the
creativity was taken to be a matter of principle rather than a product of
statutory policy. The statute—and its policy—were therefore clearly
relegated to an inferior position. What then of the obvious reality, which
Langdell could certainly not deny, that there was in fact a copyright statute
that unambiguously dealt with the subject, i.e., copyright?
It is here that we see Langdell acknowledging a role for the state, but one
that reaﬃrmed the naturalistic principles underlying his conception of
copyright. He takes as “deemed settled by authority” the fact that the act of
publication terminates the personal right to exclusivity that existed prior to
publication.135 Langdell treats the precise source of this authority as
irrelevant, given its settled nature.136 Upon such termination, the state
“interfere[s]” in favor of the author “by issuing its prohibition against the use
of his creation” and “arming him with the power to enforce such prohibition”
through a law.137 This right so produced was “wholly independent” of
property, “incorporeal” in structure and “radically diﬀerent” from the prepublication right, which treated the creation as an incorporeal thing.138 In
later work, Langdell supplemented this account by distinguishing between
the common law (pre-publication) right and copyright and conceding that
“copyright is conferred directly by statute.”139 Yet, this was not out of an
external purpose. It was instead “as a partial atonement for the wrong done
by the State in putting an end, upon publication” to the pre-publication right
of the author.140
In thus deducing the logic of copyright from the act of creativity and the
common law’s naturalism, Langdell provides an early articulation of the
private law conception of copyright. The right in copyright was a personal
right that is “negative” in nature, i.e., “a right against some person or
persons . . . not to have something done.”141 The role of the legislature was
acknowledged, but heavily circumscribed and treated as normatively
subsidiary to, and dependent on, the pre-legislation common law right.
Additionally, the legislature’s motivations behind the enactment were treated
as altogether immaterial to the deduction of copyright’s rationale and goals.
The only invocation of institutional authority was the idea of something being

135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 555.
138 Id.
139 Christopher Columbus Langdell, Classification of Rights and Wrongs, 13 HARV. L. REV. 537, 554 (1900).
140 Id. at 555.
141 Id.
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“settled by authority,”142 a conscious equivocation with clear overtones of the
judicial settlement of an issue through the common law process.
Langdell’s account embodies all of the salient features of the private law
conception of copyright, developed through Legal Formalism. It attempts to
describe copyright as a “right” vested in an individual exclusively by virtue of
that individual’s actions, eschews any search for external policies, focuses
instead on deducing the rationale of copyright law using an immanent logic,
and treats the law to be “settled by authority” quite independent of statute.
Langdell’s account had little to say about individual copyright doctrines, given
his focus on deriving an overall rationale for copyright. All the same, we see a
similar conception at play in the work of copyright treatise writers who came
to play a prominent role during this period given Formalism’s focus on
categorization and the deduction of abstract principles from individual cases.143
The most prominent copyright treatise of the Classical era was authored
by Eaton Drone, in 1879.144 In true Formalist style, Drone characterized his
task at the very outset as entailing the distillation, derivation, and explication
of copyright’s fundamental principles in a systematic and scientiﬁc manner.
In the preface to his book, he described his endeavor in the following terms:
The task of the juridical writer is to set forth the true principles which
govern the law; to point out the proper meaning of the statutes; to show what
decisions are right and what are wrong; to explain what is doubtful or obscure;
and, generally, to give the law in a form as true, clear, systematic, and harmonious
as it is in his power to do. . . . Jurisprudence is a science based on principles
rather than on single decisions. By the former rather than by the latter the law
is to be determined. It is true that one as well as the other are made by judges,
and that principles which are not judicially settled or recognized are without
force. But principles are fundamental and general. On them decisions are
grounded, by them governed, and with them must harmonize.145

142 Langdell, supra note 11, at 554.
143 See Morton J. Horwitz, The Rise of Legal Formalism, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 251, 255-56 (1975)

(describing the role of the treatise in the emergence of Legal Formalism).
144 EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL
PRODUCTIONS (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1879). Mention here might also be made of another
copyright treatise, published in 1848 by George Ticknor Curtis. See GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1848). Even though written
a little before the crystallization of Legal Formalism, it exhibits several of the same conceptual
characteristics and a focus on principles. See, e.g., id. at vi (exhorting that treatise writers not ever
forget that they are “dealing with principles”); id. at 1 (observing that copyright originates “in the
principles of general right”).
145 DRONE, supra note 144, at vii-viii.
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In area after area, Drone then proceeded to describe his account of the
law through the use of myriad “principles.”146 While he acknowledged the
existence of the copyright statute, and occasionally discussed its provisions,147
the statute as such received no additional deference. To the contrary, he
criticized several of its provisions as “[m]eaningless, inconsistent, and
inadequate,” and noted that copyright statutes had “been often drawn by
incompetent persons.”148
Drone’s treatment of the standard for copyright infringement—
“piracy”—is illustrative.149 The discussion begins by identifying the statutory
provision at issue, which prohibited the printing, publication, importation, or
sale of “any copy” of the original.150 Drone then notes that it is unclear
whether the legislature intended to cover the “substance” of a work, or just
its “verbatim” form, but proceeds rather quickly to the conclusion that
“[t]hese and kindred questions have been left to the courts . . . to be
determined by adjudicated principles.”151 The answer was thus to be found in
the principles of copyright protection, not in an independent legislative
purpose or intent. Accordingly, Drone deduces his answer through
copyright’s structure, as follows:
We must first understand what that is for which protection is given, before we
can determine what is an unlawful use of it. It has been shown elsewhere that
literary property is not limited to the precise form of words, the identical
language, in which a composition is expressed, but that it is in the intellectual
creation of which language is but a means of expression and communication.
The same production may be expressed and communicated in various
languages, without affecting its identity. The means of communication are
changed; but the thing communicated remains the same. So, in the same
language, the words may be varied; but the substantial identity of the
composition is preserved. It is this intellectual production, and not merely one
form of language in which it may be expressed, which is the fruit of the author's
genius or mental labor. It is this which is his property, and to which the law
guarantees protection. It is this whose unlawful appropriation is piracy.152

Despite allusions to copyright’s purpose, the ultimate determinant of the
doctrinal answer for Drone is seen to lie in the structure of the right
146 Id.
147 Id. at

178 (discussing copyrightable subject matter); id. at 275-76 (discussing and criticizing
the statute’s provisions dealing with the delivery of copies).
148 Id. at v.
149 Id. at 383-86.
150 Id. at 384.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 384-85.
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underlying copyright and the object of protection. From the principle that
intellectual creation generates a right in the “fruit[s]” of the creation, the
scope of the infringement analysis is thus determined to extend to nonverbatim copies as well.153
Perhaps the most direct—and impactful—instantiation of the private law
conception during the Classical era was to be seen in the judicial opinions of
the period. As scholars have noted, the Legal Formalism of this period took
shape principally in the manner in which courts adopted a “narrower,
deductive approach to decision-making whereby legal relationships were
treated as somehow subsumed under a small collection of fundamental legal
principles.”154 Within copyright, this Formalism contributed directly to the
crystallization of the private law conception wherein copyright was treated as
a naturalistic private right, immune from external policy considerations
including those espoused by Congress, and to be developed through
“principled” reasoning.
In his magisterial work on the evolution of authorship in the nineteenth
century, Oren Bracha notes how during the Classical era, judges “recoiled” from
infusing the originality doctrine with overt policy considerations, preferring
instead to confine their reasoning to the innate logic of presumptively neutral
principles.155 Bracha argues that this trend was in keeping with the judicial selfimagery of Legal Formalism, wherein judges chose not to be seen as engaged
in policymaking and social engineering (as they once had in a prior era).156 For
our purposes, Bracha’s claim also confirms the logic behind the entrenchment
of the private law conception of copyright in this period. By eschewing
considerations of social value and public welfare directly, and by preferring to
focus on the neutrality of principles as applied to the case at hand, judicial
reasoning forced itself into the exercise of emphasizing the particularized
claims and concerns of the parties before the court, i.e., the plaintiff and
defendant. And in so doing, such reasoning showcased the horizontal, rightsdriven nature of copyright as a private claim, rather than its functioning as an
instrument of broader social policy. Indeed, we see this to be true when we
examine some of the well-known Supreme Court opinions of the period, many
of which went well beyond the doctrine of originality.
Consider in this vein the celebrated case of Baker v. Selden.157 Written
during the Classical era, it showcases the working of the private law
conception. At issue was the question of whether the plaintiﬀ, who had
153 Id. at 385.
154 DUXBURY, supra note 117, at 9.
155 Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and Liberal Values in Early

American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186, 222 (2008).
156 Id.
157 101 U.S. 99 (1880).
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described a new method of bookkeeping in a monograph, could use copyright
law to prevent a defendant from using that method.158 The Court framed the
issue thus as whether the plaintiﬀ ’s copyright gave him an “exclusive right to
the use of the system” described in the book.159 Baker is understood to have
unequivocally conﬁrmed the proposition that copyright does not so give its
claimant an exclusive right to the use of the underlying method or process.
Indeed, it is commonly treated as an early instantiation of copyright’s rule
excluding functionality from the gamut of protection,160 a rule that has since
been expanded in multiple ways and is today understood as embodying
crucial public-regarding goals relating to the protection of a vibrant public
domain,161 the encouragement of free speech,162 and the facilitation of
derivative creativity.163 Yet, Baker itself makes no appeal to such publicregarding policy goals and purposes to arrive at its conclusion; indeed Baker
places surprisingly scant reliance on any purpose for copyright. Instead, it
bases its reasoning explicitly on the “principle” underlying copyright’s
exclusive right, and the rationale that a claim to the “description” (i.e.,
expression) of some teaching in a book “lays no foundation for an exclusive
claim” to the teaching itself.164 Nor does the Court attempt to ﬁnd a legislative
basis for its conclusion, despite the reality that the plaintiﬀ ’s claim—of
copyright infringement—was clearly derived from a statute. Baker’s
principled logic exempliﬁes the right-duty focus of the private law conception
in this period and its naturalistic predisposition towards copyright that
rejected an outward search for purpose/policy and legislative guidance. The
search was entirely internal to copyright law and its structure of rights.
Baker also highlights an additional reality about the private law conception
of copyright during this era, namely that it did not necessarily favor plaintiﬀs
and rightsholders at the cost of defendants and the general public. As noted
previously, the standard historical account of Classical-era jurisprudence and
Legal Formalism has argued that the private law reasoning seen in this period
was driven in large measure by an ideological desire to serve the market and
business interests, by preserving the status quo.165 It is thus distinctly treated
158 Id. at 100-01.
159 Id. at 101.
160 See, e.g., Pamela

Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes from the
Scope of Its Protection, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1922 (2007); Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment
Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work's “Total Concept and Feel,” 38
EMORY L.J. 393, 400-01 (1989).
161 See Samuelson, supra note 160, at 1933 (dealing with Baker’s concern for the public domain).
162 See id. at 1928 (noting the connection between the principle in Baker and First Amendment
considerations).
163 See id. at 1933 (connecting Baker to the concern with follow-on creativity).
164 Baker, 101 U.S. at 105.
165 HORWITZ, supra note 114, at 4-5; Grey, supra note 118, at 33.
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as antiprogressive in orientation. To the extent that Baker represents the
private law conception, it shows us that at least within copyright the private law
conception of the regime appears to have likely had relatively little such
ideological motivation behind its adoption. This certainly doesn't refute the
existence of such an ideological basis behind the overall jurisprudence of the
Classical era. The private law conception of copyright that emerged in this
era was instead quite likely the unwitting result of an approach to reasoning
that may have originated with a certain ideological/political valence in other
common law contexts.
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,166 decided by the Court shortly
after Baker, adopted the same approach in reaﬃrming the private law
conception. The case is understood as having conﬁrmed the copyrightability
of photographs.167 The question presented to the Court was whether
Congress had the authority to cover photographs in the copyright statute, in
light of the language of the speciﬁc language used in the Copyright Clause of
the Constitution.168 Being expressly called upon to review Congress’s power
to enact copyright law, the Court unhesitatingly embraced the task and
identiﬁed limitations on that power.169 Very interestingly, its focus was not
on the purpose-driven and public-regarding limits embodied in the language
of the Constitution (“promote the progress”170) but on the supposedly
principled limitations contained therein, namely, the concepts of “authorship”
and “writing.”171 In concluding that photographs satisﬁed these conceptual
criteria, Burrow-Giles nonetheless aﬃrmed a naturalistic approach to
copyright, at one point even referencing a freestanding “nature of
copyright,”172 described as “the exclusive right of a man to the production of
his own genius or intellect,”173 which it saw as applicable to photographs with
little diﬃculty. Copyright’s purpose was thus taken to lie internal to the act
of authorship, which on its own was the very logic for protection. Legislative
policy or public goals as such deserved no independent deference.
A third landmark decision from this period highlights the compatibility
of the private law conception of copyright with the statutory basis for
copyright. The case of Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus174 is credited with having
166 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
167 Christine H. Farley, The Lingering Eﬀects of Copyright's Response to the Invention of Photography,

65 U. PITT. L. REV. 385, 389-90 (2004); Justin Hughes, The Photographer’s Copyright—Photograph as
Art, Photograph as Database, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 339, 340 (2012).
168 Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 55.
169 Id. at 56-59.
170 U.S. CONST., art I, § 8, cl. 8.
171 Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58, 61.
172 Id. at 58.
173 Id.
174 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
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created the “ﬁrst sale”175 doctrine, which exempts owners of lawful copies of
a work from the reach of the distribution right when they resell or otherwise
distribute those copies to others. The plaintiﬀ publisher in Bobbs-Merrill had
inserted a notice on the ﬁrst page of its books, forbidding purchasers from
reselling them below a certain price and threatening to treat such resales
(below the said price) as copyright infringement.176 When a purchaser
breached the condition, the plaintiﬀ claimed that this amounted to
infringement of its “sole right of vending the copyrighted book.”177 In
considering the issue, the Court conceded that it was “purely a question of
statutory construction” wherein it was merely “ascertaining the legislative
intent in its enactment.”178 Nonetheless in actually addressing the issue, the
Court’s actual reasoning does little to distill any legislative history or
statutory purpose, beyond quoting large portions of the statute.179 It
eventually concluded that allowing a plaintiﬀ to unilaterally expand the scope
of infringement through a declaration was “beyond [the statute’s]
meaning.”180 But why, precisely? Hidden within the Court’s reference to
meaning and intent lies its real rationale: the plaintiﬀ ’s actions would “qualify
the title of a future purchaser” even when there was “no privity of contract,”181
something that was at odds with the common law’s discomfort with equitable
servitudes on chattels.182 The Court’s logic was thus unquestionably a matter
of principle, internal to the interaction between copyright and property law
and relating to the scope of the parties’ respective horizontal rights.
In the end then, the Court in Bobbs-Merrill restricted the scope of the
plaintiﬀ ’s exclusivity.183 And it did so by locating copyright’s primary purpose
in giving an author/owner the ability to restrict the multiplication of copies,
and little more. As the Court acknowledged, “[T]he nature of the property
and the protection intended to be given the inventor or author as the reward
of genius or intellect in the production of his book or work of art is to be
considered in construing the act of Congress . . . .”184 But, the Court observed,

175 See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2018) (codifying the ﬁrst sale doctrine in copyright).
176 Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 341-42.
177 Id. at 349.
178 Id. at 350-51.
179 Id. at 348-49.
180 Id. at 351.
181 Id. at 350-51.
182 For an overview of this discomfort over the past century, see Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable

Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REV. 945, 954-56 (1928); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Music Goes
Round and Round: Equitable Servitudes and Chattels, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1254-62 (1956); Glen O.
Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1455-60 (2004).
183 Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 351.
184 Id. at 347.
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“[I]t is evident that to secure the author the right to multiply copies of his
work may be said to have been the main purpose of the copyright statutes.”185
Baker, Burrow-Giles, and Bobbs-Merrill together symbolize the judicial
crystallization of the private law conception of copyright during the Classical
era, even though they each dealt with diﬀerent doctrinal questions.
Noticeable in each opinion is the absence of any eﬀort to locate the purposes
of copyright in goals external to the interests of the private litigants, or in
public-regarding (or social) policy considerations. They each take copyright’s
structure as a private “right” seriously, proceeding to then examine the scope,
operation, and correlatives of that right on the horizontal plane. Despite
acknowledging the legislative origins of copyright and the role of Congress
in enacting copyright law, the statutory basis of the regime as such is seen to
constrain them very little in their reliance on the identiﬁcation and
explication of copyright “principles” to decide individual cases and indeed
even understand the meaning of the statute.
As should be obvious, much of the motivation for the private law
conception during the Classical era drew from the Formalist belief in the
autonomy of legal reasoning. This enabled courts to downplay the role of
statutes and congressional motives therein, while relegating to themselves a
more central role in the development of copyright law through a declaratory
process. Courts saw themselves as merely declaring—rather than making—
the law by extracting principles from precedent and doctrine. With the
decline of Legal Formalism in the 1930s—under the Legal Realists—courts
and scholars grew to reject the idea of legal reasoning as an autonomous
endeavor that was immune from sociopolitical considerations, and the idea
that judges were not themselves making the law whilst declaring it.186
Nonetheless, the private law conception of copyright endured through the era
of Legal Realism as well.
B. Copyright Law in the Time of Legal Realism
Beginning in the 1920s, American legal thinking developed a noticeable
disenchantment with Legal Formalism. The core of this pushback emanated
from Formalism’s commitment to the autonomous nature of legal reasoning and
its corresponding belief that adjudication was altogether immune from political
(and other) influences.187 The Formalist cloak of legal determinacy and the
185 Id.
186 See

Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 468-75 (1988) (book
review) (providing a general outline of this pushback). For the accepted account of this conﬂict and
a critique of it, see TAMANAHA, supra note 116, at 13-110.
187 For further discussion of Realist critiques of Formalism, see LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL
REALISM AT YALE, 1927–1960, at 3 (1986); JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM
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study of legal doctrine as “science” came to be viewed with deep suspicion,
producing what came to be identified as the Legal Realist movement.188
The central premise of Legal Realism was its acknowledgement that legal
doctrine was innately indeterminate, in the sense of being unable to
determine outcomes on its own.189 The invocation and application of doctrine
was itself seen to be a value-laden enterprise, wherein a judge brought his or
her individual considerations and inﬂuences to bear on the enterprise. What
this then meant was that judges quite obviously “made” law, and did much
more than just discover it.190 The law’s formal conceptual categories and
abstract statements were seen as devoid of content on their own, until
invested with actual normative ideals by decision-makers. Prominent Legal
Realist academics included Roscoe Pound, Karl Llewelyn, Felix Cohen,
Thurman Arnold, Leon Green, Walter Wheeler Cook, and Arthur Corbin,
who wrote several pieces that are considered classical works of the school.191
Beyond identifying legal doctrine to be indeterminate and
nonautonomous in nature, the Legal Realists tended to diﬀer in their views

AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 1 (1995); SEBOK, supra note 27, at 3; TAMANAHA, supra note 116,
at 67-71; JUSTIN ZAREMBY, LEGAL REALISM AND AMERICAN LAW 87 (2013).
188 DUXBURY, supra note 117, at 11-12; TAMANAHA, supra note 116, at 28-32; WILLIAM
TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 13 (2d ed. 2012).
189 See Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 267, 273 (1997); Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed, 91 TEX. L. REV. 749, 749-50 (2013);
David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468, 474 (1990).
190 See, e.g., FRANK, supra note 15, at 41 (criticizing the notion that judges only discover law as “myth”);
GILMORE, supra note 114, at 62 (noting the belief that “[j]udges do not make law” and criticizing it).
191 For some of their seminal work, see THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF
GOVERNMENT (1962); THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM (1937); KARL N.
LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (1930); Thurman W. Arnold,
Apologia for Jurisprudence, 44 YALE L.J. 729 (1935); Thurman W. Arnold, Criminal Attempts—The Rise
and Fall of an Abstraction, 40 YALE L.J. 53 (1930); Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the
Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935); Felix Cohen, The Ethical Basis of Legal Criticism,
41 YALE L.J. 201 (1931); Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42
YALE L.J. 333 (1933); Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33
YALE L.J. 457 (1924); Walter Wheeler Cook, Equitable Defenses, 32 YALE L.J. 645 (1923); Arthur L.
Corbin, Rights and Duties, 33 YALE L.J. 501 (1924); Arthur L. Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology,
29 YALE L.J. 163 (1919); Leon Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. REV. 237 (1932); Leon Green,
The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014 (1928); K. N. Llewellyn, The
Normative, the Legal, and the Law-Jobs: The Problem of Juristic Method, 49 YALE L.J. 1355 (1940); K.
N. Llewellyn, On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 581 (1940); K. N.
Llewellyn, The Rule of Law in Our Case-Law of Contract, 47 YALE L.J. 1243 (1938); K. N. Llewellyn,
On Philosophy in American Law, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 205 (1934); K. Llewellyn, A Realistic
Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930); Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist
Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931); Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV.
L. REV. 641 (1923); Roscoe Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Legal Rules and Doctrines, 27 HARV.
L. REV. 195 (1914); Roscoe Pound, Justice According to Law, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 696 (1913); Roscoe
Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910); Roscoe Pound, Mechanical
Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908).
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on what normative criteria judges should and do use in arriving at decisions.
To some, the facts of individual cases and a judge’s subjective reaction to them
was the only realistic way of deciding cases and judges were exhorted to
acknowledge and articulate this reality in their opinions.192 To others, general
social facts beyond the black letter of the law provided an answer;193 and to
yet others, ethical and moral ideals ﬁlled in the space of legal
indeterminacy.194 At its core, then, Legal Realism was a theory about
adjudication.195 And it focused on the creative role of the judge in making law,
which it understood to extend beyond mechanically applying legal doctrine.
Above all else, what made Legal Realism a particularly powerful (and
controversial) movement at the time was that several of its protagonists were
themselves prominent federal judges serving on the bench. Not only did these
judges advance the core premises of the movement in their nonjudicial writing,
but they also readily gave effect to these creeds in their actual judicial opinions.
Prominent Legal Realist judges included Jerome Frank, Joseph Hutcheson,
and Leon Yankwich.196 Given the wide-ranging influence of Legal Realism
between 1920 and 1940, copyright law and jurisprudence came under its reach.
And yet, the private law conception continued to hold sway during the Realist
era even though it assumed a different expository character and emphasis.
To the Legal Formalists, maintaining the distinction between private law
and public law was crucial, given their emphasis on the autonomous and
apolitical nature of legal reasoning, which demanded equating law with
private law.197 In acknowledging the essentially indeterminate nature of legal
rules and the role of politics in judging, the Realists had little to gain from
the distinction. As historians have noted, they repudiated the rigidity of the
distinction in many respects.198 Nevertheless, the category of “private law”
192 See JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE
173-85 (1949) (discussing judges’ subjective decisionmaking processes); Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr.,
The Judgement Intuitive: The Function of the “Hunch” in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 277
(1928) (acknowledging that judicial “decision[s] will depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle
that any articulate major premise”).
193 See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE THEORY OF RULES 63-77 (Frederick Schauer ed., 2011)
(drawing a distinction between real rules and paper rules).
194 See FELIX COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS 129 (1933) (arguing that a
system of ethical norms belongs in the law).
195 See Anthony Kronman, Jurisprudential Responses to Legal Realism, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 335,
335 (1988) (“[T]he realists were interested primarily in adjudication.”); Brian Leiter, Positivism,
Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138, 1147 (1999) (book review) (describing Realism as an
account of “how adjudication really works”).
196 See generally JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Hutcheson, Jr., supra
note 192; Leon R. Yankwich, The Art of Being a Judge, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 374 (1957).
197 Grey, supra note 118, at 48; HORWITZ, supra note 114, at 10-12.
198 See HORWITZ, supra note 114, at 252-53 (describing the Realist challenge to the public–
private distinction); Horwitz, supra note 50, at 1426 (“By 1940, it was a sign of legal sophistication
to understand the arbitrariness of the division of law into public and private realms.”).
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played an important role to the Realists, both in copyright law and beyond.199
And this was primarily—though not perhaps exclusively—because Legal
Realism at its heart was a theory about adjudication, which advanced the
ideals of judicial creativity and craftsmanship in the lawmaking process as
well as the law’s receptiveness to changing circumstances. Yet all of these
ideals were most capable of direct instantiation only in the “common law,”
which valorized the role of the judge and from which all of private law traced
its provenance.200 Consequently, Realism actively embraced private law not
because of its normative signiﬁcance as a category, but instead owing to its
common law genealogy which emphasized the judicial role.
This explains why an early Legal Realist such as Wesley Hohfeld drew
entirely on areas of private law in constructing his “jural relations.”201 Given
his focus on such conceptions as employed in “judicial reasoning,” the focus
on private law was inevitable.202 Similarly, Karl Llewellyn, considered by
many to be the intellectual leader of the movement, exhibited a distinctive
private law bias in all of his work.203 Some of it originated in his own focus
as a scholar of contract law; yet it also drew in signiﬁcant measure from his
focus on the role of the judge in the “common law” appellate process, for
which areas of private law remained indispensable.204 The connection
between private law and the judicial function was thus a descriptive reality
that the Realists took for granted—and which allowed for the continuation of
the private law conception of copyright during this era.
In drawing attention to the role of the judge in actively shaping the law,
Legal Realism adopted the private law conception of copyright that had been
given shape during the Classical era. Yet, it emphasized certain aspects of the
conception over others. Much like before, it downplayed the role of the
legislature within the system and showed scant deference to legislative intent
and design. This was in keeping with the general disdain for the enterprise
of statutory interpretation that some Realists had openly expressed.205

199 See generally HANOCH DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM &
RETHINKING PRIVATE LAW THEORY (2013); Joseph William Singer, Private Law Realism, 1
CRITICAL ANALYSIS L. 226 (2014).
200 See Singer, supra note 199, at 228 (noting the connection between common law and private
law in Realist thinking).
201 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 19 (1913).
202 Id. at 58.
203 See K. N. Llewellyn, On the Problem of Teaching “Private” Law, 54 HARV. L. REV. 775, 776,
778-79 (1941) (expressing a reluctant skepticism and aﬃrmation of the category of private law).
204 TWINING, supra note 188, at 512 (describing the roots of the bias).
205 See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
about How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 396, 399 (1950) (criticizing the
indeterminancy of accepted methods of statutory interpretation).
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Instead of looking to the legislature (except when necessary206), judges
deciding copyright cases embraced their expository role through an elaborate
synthesis of fact and principle, and often set out to create copyright law.
Holding true to the common law style of reasoning that this employed,
judicial reasoning in copyright cases therefore relied heavily on precedent and
the analytical structure of the copyright claim, which continued to emphasize
the right-duty interaction underlying its entitlement structure.
On the question of purpose however, the Legal Realist variant of the private
law conception occasionally exhibited a marked ambivalence. In attempting to
break down the public–private distinction across a range of areas, Legal Realism
attempted to show how hitherto insular areas of legal doctrine were (and could
be) driven by normative considerations that often extended well beyond the
immediate context of the parties before the court; i.e., that the judicial function
could be employed for the enterprise of social engineering.207 On occasion, this
therefore necessitated overtly recognizing the role of public-regarding goals
within the analysis. At the same time, the legitimacy of the judicial function,
which Realism greatly valued, required the approach to ground itself in the
internal, doctrine-driven purposes of an area of law. Consequently, discussions
of copyright law (especially judicial) either avoided engaging copyright’s
purpose and justification altogether, or on the rare occasion that it did do so,
moved between inward- and outward-looking purposes while giving the former
a distinctively superior position in the discussion.208
Scholarly writing during the Realist era manifested the private law
conception rather readily, and with few problems. Writing in 1939, Kenneth
Umbreit, a lawyer-historian set out to answer the seemingly simple question:
“[w]hat is a [c]opyright?”209 In answering the question, his argument attempts
to ascertain the “nature of the property” underlying copyright.210 The
206 Such as when it involved a statutory provision that squarely and unambiguously covered a
certain question—e.g., copyright duration.
207 See G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social
Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999, 1020 (1972) (discussing the roots of
the Realists’ conception of progress).
208 See, e.g., Pearson v. Wash. Publ’g. Co., No. 6921, 1938 WL 27406, at *3 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 25,
1938) (describing the “two major purposes” of copyright law as “(1) to secure to the author, or his
successors in interest, a monopoly, more or less in the nature of a reward for his genius and
industry . . . as well as for the encouragement of others, similarly as in the case of patents” and “(2)
to give notice to the public that the author or other owner has not abandoned the child of his
intellect, or dedicated it to public use” (footnote omitted)); Patterson v. Century Prods., 93 F.2d
489, 493 (2d Cir. 1937) (noting that copyright laws have “for their object the protection of the
property which the author has in the right to publish his production, the purpose of the statute being
to protect this right in such manner that the author may have the beneﬁt of this property for a
limited term of years”).
209 Kenneth B. Umbreit, A Consideration of Copyright, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 932, 951 (1939).
210 Id. at 952.
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argument’s use of property is worthy of attention. Unlike in the Classical era
where property was thought to have a determinate meaning and bring with it
a set of fundamental normative consequences, during the era of Realism the
very idea of property came under scrutiny.211 As a result of such scrutiny, the
concept of property was itself shown to be devoid of static meaning that could
be contextually transposed from one setting to another.212 Consequently, when
copyright writing during this period used the word “property,” it was often as
a mere analytical stand-in for the idea of an exclusive right, rather than a
loaded term that carried implications drawn from real or personal property.
Umbreit’s writing showcases the Realist use of the term “property” by
revealing a natural restraint in having it do any normative work in the
argument. Umbreit’s argument also highlights the Realist disdain for the
statute, which at the time was the Copyright Act of 1909, produced as part of a
comprehensive general revision of the law.213 He thus notes that “the statute is
about as useful to a lawyer confronted with [copyright] questions as a copy of
Quia Emptores is to a modern conveyancer” and that the law revealed a “judicial
tendency” to develop the law “without awaiting statutory recognition.”214
Perhaps the best known scholarly treatment of copyright during the
Realist era was that of the famed First Amendment scholar Zechariah Chafee,
Jr., a Harvard Law School professor.215 Reﬂecting on the need for copyright
reform and the development of copyright principles under the 1909 Act,
Chafee—despite being something of a public law scholar—was ﬁrm in noting
that “[t]he primary purpose of copyright is, of course, to beneﬁt the
author.”216 All the same, he was under no illusion that “the very eﬀect of
protecting them is to make the enjoyment of their creations more costly.”217
Consequently, the answer to him was balancing the private and public
interest: ensuring that copyright “does not impose a burden on the public
substantially greater than the beneﬁt it gives to the author.”218 Here, we see
the Realist era ambivalence towards allowing public-regarding ideals into the
working of a private law institution; Chafee is fully content doing so, but

211 For Realist scrutiny of the traditional deﬁnition of and justiﬁcations for property, see
generally Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357 (1954); Morris R.
Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927); Singer, supra note 186, at 487. For an
account of the Realist move to treat property law as public law, see HORWITZ, supra note 114, at 165.
212 Id.
213 Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-320, 35 Stat. 1075.
214 Umbreit, supra note 209, at 951.
215 For an overview of Chafee’s contributions, see generally DONALD L. SMITH, ZECHARIAH
CHAFEE, JR.: DEFENDER OF LIBERTY AND LAW (1986).
216 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 506 (1945).
217 Id. at 507.
218 Id.
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introduces a clear hierarchy wherein the individual author’s interest is treated
as paramount and the basis of legal doctrine.
Chafee’s writing also aﬃrms the era’s use of property as an analytical idea
lacking independent content. Noting that “there is no magic in words like
‘property’ or ‘ownership’” when applied to copyright, he thus concluded that
“[t]he scope of protection for each kind of property should depend on its
nature and on the appropriate beneﬁts and burdens caused by private
ownership.”219 Characterizing copyright as property was therefore acceptable,
but of little consequence as such.
Ultimately, it was in courts’ jurisprudence of this era that the private law
conception of copyright continued to hold sway. As scholars have noted, it
was the Second Circuit during this era (rather than the Supreme Court) that
emerged as the most important and inﬂuential court.220 Much of this was a
consequence of the court’s composition, which comprised several prominent
scholar-judges, many who were Legal Realists, and came to exert a lasting
impact on the jurisprudence of the era. Prominent among the court’s judges
at the time were Learned Hand and Jerome Frank.221
Hand alone played a hugely inﬂuential role in the development of
copyright law during this period. While he publicly distanced himself from
being labelled a Legal Realist,222 his views mirrored those of his Realist
colleagues in multiple respects. Hand’s copyright opinions were marked by a
common law ﬂourish and willingness to connect copyright principles to the
facts of individual cases that made them especially noteworthy.223 While he
often advocated a philosophy of judicial restraint in general, as scholars have
noted, he used this as a mechanism to liberate his own legal reasoning within
the domain that he relegated to himself.224 We see this in his copyright
opinions no less.

219 Id. at 510.
220 See MARVIN SCHICK, LEARNED HAND’S COURT 336-37 (1970).
221 Id. at 13, 34.
222 See GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE

450 (2011)
(detailing an episode where Hand publicly disparaged Legal Realism). Despite this reality, Hand’s
aﬃnity for the Legal Realist method and credo cannot be doubted. His opinion in Carroll Towing,
wherein he crafted the now famous “Hand Formula” for negligence using economic insights, remains
a perfect example of Realist legal reasoning. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169,
173 (2d Cir. 1947) (distilling negligence liability to the formula B < PL, wherein “P” stands for the
probability of injury, “L” stands for the extent of injury, and “B” stands for the burden of avoiding
that injury); ZAREMBY, supra note 187, at 109 (noting that with the Hand Formula “economic
analysis was used to further the law”).
223 GUNTHER, supra note 222, at 268-73.
224 See Carl Landauer, Scholar, Craftsman, and Priest: Learned Hand’s Self-Imaging, 3 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 231, 240 (1991) (“[D]espite Hand’s exaggerated belief in the limits of judicial power, he
was convinced that there was a realm in which judges had immense authority.”).
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Hand’s copyright opinions disavow reliance on any grand philosophical
motivation in their reasoning.225 Nor do they come across as mechanistic or
rule-driven, despite their extensive reliance on past precedent. Instead, they
reveal an acute engagement with the factual record and the nature of the work
seeking protection.226 In then relying on precedent and principle to fashion a
rule of application to the facts, Hand’s exposition adopted a declaratory and
prophetic tone that marked his conﬁdence with the subject. His opinion in
the oft-cited case of Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. illustrates this.227 After
setting out the facts of the case and analyzing prior precedent on the
infringement analysis to distill a rule,228 the opinion goes out of its way to
make a variety of observations that have since then stood the test of time: the
“abstractions” formulation,229 the notion that “nobody ever can” ﬁx the
boundary between idea and expression,230 and perhaps most importantly that
even though judicial line-drawing on the issue may seem “arbitrary,” courts
should not shy away from the issue.231 A similar pattern is to be seen in several
of his other leading copyright opinions.232 Indeed, a hallmark of Hand’s
jurisprudence in the copyright realm appears to be his express willingness to
treat copyright’s “principles” as being independent of the formal origin of the
law itself, i.e., whether statutory or common law. In one case, he would thus
observe that “[c]opyright in any form, whether statutory or at common-law,
is a monopoly; it consists only in the power to prevent others from
reproducing the copyrighted work.”233 All the same, there were occasions
when Hand’s ideal of judicial restraint came through, especially when
expressly called upon (by a party) to make law in an area altogether devoid of

225 See, e.g., G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1952); National Comics Publ’ns
v. Fawcett Publ’ns, 191 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951); Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music
Co., 140 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1944); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Bryan, 123 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1941);
RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.,
81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930); Cheney
Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (1929).
226 See, e.g., G. Ricordi, 194 F.2d at 915 (exploring how the nature of typography aﬀects
copyright); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 123 F.2d at 699-700 (examining the context surrounding a song’s
creation); Sheldon, 81 F.2d at 49-53 (comparing, in detail, the stories in a movie and a play); Nichols,
45 F.2d at 120-22 (outlining, in-depth, the plots and characters of two motion picture plays).
227 See Nichols, 45 F.2d at 119-23.
228 Id. at 120-222.
229 Id. at 121.
230 Id.
231 See id. at 122 (“[W]hile we are as aware as any one that the line, where-ever it is drawn, will
seem arbitrary, that is no excuse for not drawing it . . . .”).
232 See, e.g., G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914, 914-16 (2d Cir. 1952); Sheldon v. MetroGoldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 53-55 (2d Cir. 1936).
233 RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1940).
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precedent.234 Copyright principles were thus, ﬁrst and foremost to Hand,
principles embedded in the positive law of the time.
Hand’s more openly Realist-leaning contemporaries on the Second
Circuit, such as Frank, were signiﬁcantly less informed about copyright law
and doctrine than Hand was, a reality that comes across in their decisions.
Nonetheless, taking their cue from Hand, their opinions too adopted the
same general pattern as Hand’s did. Heavily fact-dependent and driven by
the search for copyright principles, they reveal a willingness to embrace
judicial lawmaking in the domain with little deference to the legislature or to
an implicit legislative design. Frank’s majority opinion in Arnstein v. Porter
epitomizes this tendency.235 Developing the law from ﬁrst principles, the case
does not so much as reference the copyright statute above-the-line even once,
and instead gives it an overtly transsubstantive dimension.236 The only
allusion to copyright’s purpose is to be found in one sentence in the opinion,
where he notes that the plaintiﬀ’s “legally protected interest” is not a
reputation-driven one, but instead the “potential ﬁnancial returns” from the
work.237 Interestingly, Frank derives this proposition from prior case law, and
at the end of a string of judicial precedent introduces a citation to a few
provisions of the Copyright Act, revealing its use of the word “proﬁt.”238
Frank’s opinion in Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts exhibits the same
trend.239 Drawing on his own conception of the creative process, Frank
develops the rule that unintentional—and purely fortuitous—variations
could constitute original contributions that render a work copyrightable.240
Frank’s rationale for this innovation is seemingly driven entirely by ﬁrst
principles with no reference whatsoever to the statute or legislative intent,
nor indeed to any conception of copyright’s purposes.241
The Realist variant of the private law conception was hardly limited to the
Second Circuit. Cain v. Universal Pictures Co. exemplifies its broader reach.242 In
that case, Judge Leon Yankwich coined the notion of “scènes à faire” stock
elements used by all creators working within a genre, and which were
234 See Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 281 (2d Cir. 1929) (“Judges have only a
limited power to amend the law; when the subject has been conﬁded to a Legislature, they must
stand aside, even though there be an hiatus in completed justice.”).
235 125 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
236 Id. at 468-75.
237 Id. at 473.
238 Id. at 473 n.20.
239 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
240 Id. at 105.
241 See id. at 105 nn.24-25 (drawing his conclusion from the principle that “great scientiﬁc
discoveries have resulted from accidents” and prior cases that held that “a patentable invention may
stem from an accidental discovery”).
242 47 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D. Cal. 1942).
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unprotectable components of the work.243 In so doing, the opinion placed
reliance entirely on related precedent and copyright “principles.”244 In reflecting
on his work as a judge many years after the decision in Cain, Yankwich identified
“creative judging” as an important hallmark of the judicial enterprise, wherein
“judges apply and adapt to [new conditions] old precepts and principles,”
thereby producing “new law” through “adjudication” that reveals judges’ views
on the “social needs” of the time.245 In later work, he even echoed Hand’s
understanding that copyright was the “right of printing or multiplying copies of
an original work . . . to the exclusion of others.”246 Yankwich’s thinking
internalized the dominant Realist credo, as refracted through the constraints of
the judicial process and copyright law. In Cain—and in Yankwich’s thinking and
writing—we once again see the private law conception at play: an emphasis on
copyright’s horizontal structure, a downplaying of legislative guidance, the
derivation of copyright logic, purpose, and principle from within its functioning,
and an overt affirmation of the judicial role in expounding copyright principle
and developing copyright doctrine.
To be sure, the generic Realist disaﬀection for the private law/public law
distinction had the eﬀect of diluting the private law conception of copyright
over time and introduced important cracks in its foundations. If legal
reasoning was not autonomous and indeed took color from social, economic,
and political considerations, what reason was there to continue to look within
copyright doctrine and principles to shape the course of the law? If outwardfacing considerations were relevant to copyright, why did judges need to have
a monopoly over the exposition and development of copyright doctrine? And
if considerations beyond those embodied in the formal sources of law became
fair game in the development of copyright law, would not this render
copyright law rampantly indeterminate and subject it to the whims of an
unelected judiciary? Embodied within the Realist variant of the private law
conception were therefore important analytical contradictions, most of which
had been successfully cabined oﬀ by the courts themselves in order to allow
the system to ﬂourish. It was therefore but a matter of time before this
equilibrium was unsettled and the approach unraveled.
***
The private law conception of copyright thus thrived in the period between
1860 and 1940, and was characterized by an emphasis on the horizontal,
243 Id. at 1017.
244 See id. at 1016

(citing precedent and then noting that “[w]ith these principles in mind, the
problems involved here can be solved easily”).
245 Yankwich, supra note 196, at 377-78.
246 Leon R. Yankwich, What is Fair Use?, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 204 (1954).
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principle-based, and common law-oriented aspects of the regime. The purpose
of copyright was rooted in the justification for the author’s rights in the
creative work and the copier’s correlative wrongdoing, both of which almost
always assumed an individualist dimension. While copyright jurisprudence
retained this general orientation under the Legal Realists, Legal Realism
nonetheless posed a real challenge to the narrowly analytical focus of the
private law conception, which exalted judicial lawmaking while simultaneously
confirming the indeterminacy of law and legal reasoning. What was needed
was an approach that could address the challenge of indeterminacy posed by
Realism, while simultaneously retaining its claim to democratic legitimacy and
the integrity of law and the legal method. Enter the Legal Process.
III. THE LEGAL PROCESS TURN IN COPYRIGHT
Even though the private law conception of copyright continued to
dominate through the 1940s, the central insights of Legal Realism had put
serious cracks in its foundations. Above all else, its reliance on the conceptual
architecture of the entitlement for its normative ideals and purposes seemed
largely misplaced. While the juricentric focus of Realism had enabled the
survival of the private law conception, it was only a matter of time before that
last thread was severed.
In drawing attention to the myth of doctrinal determinacy, as well as the
necessarily political nature of judicial decisionmaking, Legal Realism had
succeeded in debunking the Formalist belief in the autonomous nature of legal
reasoning.247 All the same, it failed to offer a sufficiently coherent alternative
in its place. If legal reasoning and adjudication were as indeterminate and
unpredictable as they claimed, the legal system appeared indelibly irrational.
The system’s commitment to the rule of law would then be little more than a
farce.248 While the Realists might have been willing to maintain this position
as an academic matter, the events of the Second World War—and the birth of
totalitarianism around the world—made their commitment to skepticism
altogether unpalatable, especially as a prescriptive matter.249

247 DUXBURY, supra
248 See Eskridge &

note 117, at 158-59.
Frickey, Introduction, supra note 8, at lxv; William M. Wiecek, American
Jurisprudence After the War: “Reason Called Law”, 37 TULSA L. REV. 857, 859 (2002) (describing how
Legal Realism succeeded in debunking the determinacy of law but also “wash[ed] away the law’s
foundations in certitude, truth, stability, permanence, and above all, impartiality”); see also EDWARD
A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE
PROBLEM OF VALUE 235-60 (1973) (describing the “reorientation” in thought from empiricism and
relativism to “pragmatic and naturalistic attitudes”).
249 See Jerome Hall, Nulla Poena Sine Lege, 47 YALE L.J. 165, 191 (1937) (comparing the views of
the “extreme Legal Realists” to the “uncontrolled positivism” in Europe that produced the World War).

1146

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 1101

Following the war, the Realists distanced themselves from their
commitment to the prediction-theory of the law.250 Llewellyn thus openly
retracted his statement that the law was nothing more than oﬃcial action
devoid of ethical content and claimed to do “open penance” for pushing the
skeptical agenda.251 The juricentrism of Realist thinking therefore came under
direct attack, especially insofar as it was associated with the school’s theory of
law. Llewellyn himself conceded that appellate court decisionmaking faced a
“crisis of conﬁdence” and was viewed with extreme “cynicism” during any
eﬀort to discern the law.252
Ironically, juricentrism also came under direct attack within copyright law
circles, but for seemingly unrelated reasons. With technological
developments having rendered several aspects of the Copyright Act of 1909
obsolete and in serious need of updating, courts had come to play a major role
in keeping the system aﬂoat—through their development of the law in
common law fashion.253 And as with other areas of the common law, this
approach had generated its own fault lines including conﬂicting and
inconsistent decisions, circuit splits, frequent changes, and judge-made rules
that contradicted the text of the statute.254 This brought the role of courts
within the copyright system into disrepute, with some describing the
judiciary’s attempted upkeep of the regime as “ridiculous” and “chaotic.”255
There is little evidence that the problems identiﬁed with the judge-made
copyright law of the time were any greater—or indeed of any greater
signiﬁcance—than similar problems long understood as a byproduct of judgemade law and the common law process more generally.256 The system-wide
concern with rule indeterminacy and unbounded discretion, which assumed
a level of “frenz[y]” and “intensity” because of the war, appears to have
coalesced with the call for copyright reform that had begun even before the
war.257 The ideals of certainty, accountability, and democratic legitimacy had
250 See HORWITZ, supra note 114, at 247-48 (describing this retraction).
251 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND

PRACTICE 152 (rev.
ed. 2008). For a charitable reading and account of Llewellyn’s move away from traditional Legal
Realism, see William Twining, The Idea of Juristic Method: A Tribute to Karl Llewellyn, 48 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 119, 124 (1993).
252 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 4, 198 (1960).
253 For examples of courts fashioning or updating rules to address new technologies, see
Washingtonian Publ’g Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30 (1939); Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S.
191 (1931); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955); White v.
Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1952); Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1946).
254 See KAPLAN, supra note 35, at 80-85.
255 U.S. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE GENERAL
REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 81 (1965); KAPLAN, supra note 35, at 81-82.
256 For an overview of these problems, see Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
257 PURCELL, supra note 248, at 176, 219.
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assumed new meaning after the war, and copyright law/reform got swept up
by their obvious allure. With American legal thinking shedding its aﬃnity for
juricentrism, conceptualism, and skeptical positivism, the time was ripe for a
fundamentally diﬀerent approach to legal reasoning and analysis; one that
emphasized the centrality of the rule of law by giving it functional content,
and at the same time attempted to realize a democratic consensus in the
creation and application of legal rules. Moving lawmaking away from courts
and towards the other more representative branches of government emerged
as an obvious direction—both within copyright law and beyond. Thus
emerged the Legal Process turn in American thinking.
A. Legal Process Theory
The intellectual roots of this move took shape at the Harvard Law School.
Just before the war, then law professor Felix Frankfurter began to advocate a
move away from the school’s focus on common law-based private law subjects,
and towards a greater understanding of “administrative law,” which he saw as
crucial to understanding the modern administrative state that had emerged
following the New Deal.258 “[A]dministrative solutions to social problems”
formed a recurrent theme in his writing.259 When he took his position on the
Supreme Court, his judicial opinions in the decades after revealed a similar
emphasis, including an application of his insistence on “judicial self-restraint”
and judicial “humility.”260 Even after his departure from the Harvard law faculty,
Frankfurter’s views continued to hold sway on his colleagues, and scholars have
noted how leading into the 1950s, he was “God” to many of them.261 His
influence on three such colleagues produced the Legal Process School.
The ﬁrst was Lon Fuller, a legal theorist and scholar of contract law.262
While initially a Legal Realist, Fuller had grown disenchanted with the
movement and become an outspoken critic of the school’s skeptical ideas. This
anti-skepticism coalesced with his well-known attack on legal positivism,
258 See Frankfurter, Administrative Law, supra note 52, at 614-15, 620-21 (calling for “[i]ntensive
studies” of “the processes, the practices, the determining factors of administrative decisions”); see
also HORWITZ, supra note 114, at 236 (noting how Frankfurter’s emphasis as a professor had been to
“move the center of intellectual gravity away from an exclusive emphasis on nineteenth-century
private law subjects toward a twentieth-century public law focus”).
259 HORWITZ, supra note 114, at 236.
260 See Erwin N. Griswold, Felix Frankfurter—Teacher of the Law, 76 HARV. L. REV. 7, 11 (1962);
Wiecek, supra note 248, at 868-69.
261 See Peter B. Edelman, Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence and the Good Society: Shades of Felix
Frankfurter and the Harvard Hit Parade of the 1950s, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 1799 (1991) (“At the
Harvard Law School which Justice Scalia attended in the late 1950s, Felix Frankfurter was God.”).
262 For thorough accounts of Fuller’s scholarship and contributions to jurisprudence, see
generally KRISTEN RUNDLE, FORMS LIBERATE: RECLAIMING THE JURISPRUDENCE OF LON L
FULLER (2012); ROBERT SUMMERS, LON L. FULLER (1984).
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resulting in the famous Hart-Fuller debate.263 Fuller’s work emphasized the
law’s intrinsic connection between the “is” and the “ought” and maintained
that “reason” was the ultimate methodology of law, which give it its ethical
component.264 And it was adjudication that gave “formal and institutional
expression to the inﬂuence of reasoned argument in human aﬀairs” but at the
same time had its own limits insofar as there were questions unsuited to
adjudicative disposition and better “left to the legislature.”265
Frankfurter’s two other fellow travelers were Albert Sacks, his former law
clerk, and Henry Hart, the intellectual leader of the Harvard Law faculty at
the time.266 Fuller, Hart, and Sacks formed a “mutual admiration society” and
built on each other’s ideas and writings.267 Beginning in the 1950s, Hart and
Sacks assembled a set of teaching materials for their class, which they titled
“The Legal Process.” In it, they provide an elaborate account of their
approach to law. While acknowledging the Realist insight that legal doctrine
was on its own incapable of cabining discretion, they nonetheless sought to
argue that legal discretion could be channeled through “institutionalized . . .
arrangements” that distributed the lawmaking function among diﬀerent legal
actors.268 Whereas Fuller had constructed his argument in largely
theoretical/abstract terms, Hart and Sacks developed their theory through a
set of problems. In The Legal Process, which became the classical work of the
Legal Process School, they thus eﬀectively developed a systematic account of
what law was, one that connected the actual content of legal rules
(“substantive” arrangements) to the method and process through which they
were generated and accepted (“procedural” arrangements).269 Much has been
written about the theory of law advanced by the Legal Process School.270 All
the same, to appreciate its signiﬁcance for the transformation of copyright
law, three aspects of the theory are worthy of elucidation.

263 Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV.
630 (1958). For Hart’s work, see H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71
HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958).
264 See LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 5-12 (1940).
265 Fuller, supra note 17, at 354, 366.
266 See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE HIGH CITADEL: THE INFLUENCE OF HARVARD LAW
SCHOOL 82 (1978) (describing the stature and inﬂuence of Hart at the time); William M. Wiecek,
The Birth on the Constitution: The United States Supreme Court, 1941-53, in 12 THE HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 451 n.47 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 2006) (discussing Sacks
and his connection to Frankfurter).
267 Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 8, at lxxxiii.
268 HART & SACKS, supra note 8, at 3-4.
269 Id. at 3-4.
270 For an overview of this voluminous literature, see generally Eskridge & Frickey, Making,
supra note 17; see also Barzun, supra note 17, at 8-18 (discussing the inﬂuence and criticism of Hart &
Sacks’ work).
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1. The (Collective) Instrumentalism of Law
Fundamental to Legal Process thinking was the recognition that law was
an intrinsically instrumental or purposive enterprise that does not exist for its
own sake. While Hart and Sacks gave this version of instrumentalism its
functional content, the idea finds its origins in the work of Fuller, who
maintained that any attempt to neatly separate out the “is” and the “ought” in
the law was a futile exercise.271 Analogizing legal reasoning to the process of
retelling a story, Fuller argued that a “statute or decision is not a segment of
being, but [is] . . . a process of becoming.”272 Through the process of reasoned
interpretation, “it becomes . . . something that it was not originally.”273 Laws
therefore embody both “words” and “an objective sought,” and the two go hand
in hand in the very idea of law, a premise that positivism stridently rejected.274
Fuller’s theoretical observations formed the premise of the Hart-Sacks
formulation of law, seen in The Legal Process. To them,
Law is a doing of something, a purposive activity, a continuous striving to
solve the basic problems of social living . . . . Legal arrangements (laws) are
provisions for the future in aid of this effort. Sane people do not make provisions
for the future which are purposeless. It can be accepted as a fixed premise,
therefore, that every statute and every doctrine of unwritten law developed by
the decisional process has some kind of purpose or objective . . . .275

In identifying the ultimate purpose of law as inhering in the realities of
social living, Hart and Sacks readily subscribed to a collectivist vision. Early
on in their book, they give the idea more direct expression and note that it
remains an undeniable reality of “human existence” that human beings live
“under . . . conditions of interdependence,” which generates a “common
interest.”276 Laws—i.e., legal arrangements—arise because of this common
enterprise, with the overarching purpose of fostering interdependence.277
Hart and Sacks thus gave the inherent purposiveness of law an avowedly
collectivist orientation in their framing. Yet this was not because of their belief
in any form of simple utilitarianism, a reading of their theory that is far too
simplistic.278 It was instead because of their attempt to connect “arrangements”

271 FULLER, supra note 264, at 8-10.
272 Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
273 Id. at 10.
274 Id. at 9.
275 HART & SACKS, supra note 8, at 148.
276 Id. at 2.
277 Id. at 2-4.
278 This simplistic reading seems to derive

from their use of the term “wants” and their claim
that the satisfaction of these wants was a basic purpose of social living, terms that are commonly
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to legal institutions and the mechanisms that such institutions employed.279
The essence of law was thus the “institutionaliz[ation] [of] procedures for the
settlement of questions of group concern.”280 Law was collectivist problem
solving, which made it a process rather than a static result. As Charles Barzun
has argued, the overarching orientation of this account was therefore
pragmatic, rather than utilitarian.281
The instrumental orientation of law achieved two things at once. First, it
distanced the account from the idea of law as an autonomous enterprise,
which embodied its own normative premises. And second, it infused the law
with a plausible ethical component, one that was rooted in the collectivism
inherent in a functional democracy. In so doing, it distinguished itself from
the skeptical project of Legal Realism and gave the idea of law a functioning
set of normative commitments, all of which were rooted in the idea of
“arrangements” for “group” living.282
At its core then, the instrumentalism of law that the Legal Process School
emphasized was an institutional instrumentalism. This institutional turn was
an inﬂection that it introduced in order to reiterate the existence of an ethical
content for law, which it readily located within the paradigm of American
democracy. Since institutions epitomized the ideal of democratic legitimacy,
the institutional turn necessarily embodied a majoritarian emphasis. And by
rooting the purpose of law in the maintenance of conditions for collective (or
group) living, the theory implicitly seemed to prioritize collective ideals—
enshrined in its institutional vision—over individual ones.
It bears emphasizing that the collectivism of the Hart-Sacks conception
of law was in the end an abstract one, in that it focused on the ultimate aims
of law and legal arrangements rather than on individual decisions and
doctrines. Yet, it was to inform and guide all decisions, even at lower levels,
and even if only indirectly.283 Inconspicuous as it may have seemed, it
performed an important framing role for legal analysis and reasoning.
2. Institutional Settlement and the Primacy of Legislation
Closely related to the instrumental orientation of law in the Legal Process
account was its core idea—“institutional settlement.”284 Described by Hart

associated with the utilitarian ideas of Bentham and Mill. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY
AND ITS CRITICS 94 (1989).
279 HART & SACKS, supra note 8, at 3.
280 Id. (emphasis omitted).
281 Barzun, supra note 17, at 21-25.
282 HART & SACKS, supra note 8, at 3.
283 Id. at 148-49.
284 Id. at 4-5.
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and Sacks as the “central idea of law,” institutional settlement stood for the
principle that decisions arrived at through “duly established procedures” were
to be accepted as “binding” on all of society, until those procedures
themselves were changed.285 The intrinsic democratic legitimacy of the
institutional arrangements created by the legal order (and the Constitution)
required accepting the substantive outcomes of those arrangements. The
overriding motivation for this framework was fairly apparent: it sought to
root the substantive legitimacy of the law in the institutional framework
through which it was generated.
Institutional settlement was also the mechanism that the Legal Process
School employed to give eﬀect to its conﬂation of the “is” and the “ought.”
Whether something is the law on a point was seen as primarily a product of
whether it was generated by the institutional framework and body that ought
to be tasked with its creation. In so doing, institutional settlement gave the
notion of separation of powers real signiﬁcance in determining the
substantive content of the law.
Determining whether a question is “settled” by an institution therefore
begins with an account of what kinds of questions are appropriately within the
domain of each institution—in different substantive areas of law.286 And it is
here that the Legal Process School developed a coherent normative framework.
Even though they recognized the importance of “decisional law” within the
legal system, Hart and Sacks noted a fundamental difference between the forms
of lawmaking that courts and legislatures could engage in.287 At the top of the
hierarchy, and vested with peremptory authority, was the legislature:
In the American legal system ﬁnal responsibility for making such changes [in
the body of working arrangements] is entrusted to the legislature, subject to
such limits as the governing constitution places upon the legislature’s powers
and subject also to the extraordinary procedure of constitutional amendment.
The function is inherently discretionary. For the number of potential changes
that can be made in existing arrangements is inﬁnite, and choice among the
inﬁnity of possibilities can never be controlled by any “scientiﬁc” test.
Discretion also must include whether to legislate or not to
legislate . . . . In the ﬁeld of arrangements governing private activity, every
American legislature possesses and constantly exercises this vitally signiﬁcant
discretion whether to legislate at all.
In the exercise of this discretion . . . legislatures make . . . changes in the
grounds of decision that courts are directed to employ—of changes, in other
285 Id. at 4.
286 Id. at 5.
287 Id. at 163-65.
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words, in the content of self-applying regulatory arrangements. . . . In
making changes of [this] type, the legislature reviews the soundness for the
future of the speciﬁc judgments of policy embodied in the ground of decision
it replaces. The changes it decides upon will in many, if not all, cases be
changes which it would have been within the power of a court to introduce
in the ﬁrst instance. In this sphere . . . court and legislature are in some sense
in competition, with the legislature having the last word for the future.288

Courts were to play an important role within the system, principally as
problem solvers. In so doing, courts engaged in a task that the Legal Process
School identiﬁed as “reasoned elaboration.”289 Reasoned elaboration was
intricately connected to the idea that laws—of all kinds—embodied a “policy”
or objective/purpose and were based on an admonition to courts to situate
their decisionmaking around the identiﬁcation and clariﬁcation of the law’s
purposes.290 Purposes were seen to abound in diﬀerent parts of the legal
system (owing to law’s intrinsic purposiveness), and the courts’ job was to
“rationaliz[e]” these purposes, recognizing there to be an obvious hierarchy
between the speciﬁc and more general ones.291 With decisional law, the body
of court-made law, courts were free to utilize a variety of sources and
principles to elaborate on the purpose of the law at hand. But with areas of
law deﬁned by statutes, Hart and Sacks were clear that courts should not see
themselves as being “in the same position as a legislator” but instead “respect
the position of the legislature in the institutional system.”292
Thus, in domains where Congress had acted—statutorily—Congress was to
be regarded as the primary determinant of the law’s policy (or objectives), which
courts were to glean from the terms of the statute as well as its context, and then
elaborate on when needed. In other words, the “policy” of the law for a statutory
regime was the ultimate responsibility of Congress, which courts could do little
to question, negate, or override.293 This was an idea first enunciated by Roscoe
Pound, and later further developed by Felix Frankfurter.294 Statutes—on their
own—could serve as freestanding sources of both law and legal reasoning, and
thus embody a distinctive policy within their four corners.
On the face of things, this may have appeared to resuscitate the positivist
divide between the “is” and the “ought,” especially insofar as it appeared to
288 Id. at 164-65 (citation omitted).
289 Id. at 145-52.
290 Id. at 147-49.
291 Id. at 148.
292 Id. at 143.
293 Id. at 165.
294 For an account of Pound’s arguments,

see Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 8, at
lviii. For Frankfurter’s view, see Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
COLUM. L. REV. 527, 531-32, 538 (1947) [hereinafter Frankfurter, Reflections].
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require courts to focus entirely on stating the law as it is. This is where the
idea of reasoned elaboration assumed signiﬁcance, to collapse the is/ought
divide by giving courts a good amount of—but nonetheless bounded—leeway
in developing the purposes of the law.295 In requiring courts to deploy their
powers of reason and persuasion in deciding cases and in interpreting the law,
the Legal Process School has been understood as implicitly aﬃrming a
purposivist or “dynamic” approach to interpretation.296 While courts were
thus subservient to the legislature in determining a statute’s policy, they
nonetheless had a responsibility to elaborate on it, and then show a
connection between their decisionmaking in an individual case and the
statutory policy at issue. While courts could thus elaborate on the policy once
created by the statute, this subsidiarity was critical; or, as Frankfurter put it,
judges were to develop a “trained[] reluctance” to cross the line from
adjudication to legislation.297
The extent of subsidiarity was of course not constant. In situations where
the legislature has itself delegated policymaking to courts (e.g., “common law
statutes”298), the deference was to be fairly minimal. But in comprehensive
statutory regimes, courts were to glean the policy from the text and context.
“[W]here policy is expressed by the . . . legislature, judges must respect such
expressions by adding to or subtracting from the explicit terms which the
lawmakers use no more than is called for by the shorthand nature of
language.”299 The law’s purposes (or policy) were thus embedded within the
terms of the statute, which the legislature alone had the ability to dictate and
change; courts were to elaborate and interpret this policy with due deference.300
Related to the primacy of the legislature (and of statutes) was the role
that the Legal Process theory accorded to administrative expertise. While
Hart and Sacks only dealt with the question in passing,301 they nonetheless
observed the importance of having the legislature delegate its lawmaking
“discretion” to administrative agencies in diﬀerent domains in order to
295 HART & SACKS, supra note 8, at 147.
296 Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra

note 8, at cxxix; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1481-97 (1987) (detailing the “dynamic”
approach).
297 Frankfurter, Reflections, supra note 294, at 535.
298 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899-900 (2007) (“From
the beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law statute.” (citations omitted));
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544 (1983) (“The statute books are
full of laws . . . that eﬀectively authorize courts to create new lines of common law.”); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1052 (1989) (“The
Court's invocation of common law principles to ﬁll in gaps within fairly detailed statutes . . . is a
regular occurrence . . . .”).
299 Frankfurter, Reflections, supra note 294, at 535.
300 See id. at 538 (observing how policy is to be within the “words” of the statute).
301 See HART & SACKS, supra note 8, at 165-66.
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enhance the “eﬀectiveness” of the regime.302 Courts were meant to follow
administrative action using the same general framework of institutional
settlement, depending on the precise kind of question being addressed by the
agency. Later scholars have applied the Legal Process framework in even
more detail to administrative regulation, arguing that its ideas about reasoned
elaboration, purposive interpretation, and deference to expertise carry over
to the realm of administrative agencies with few problems.303
3. The Structured Collapse of the Private Law/Public Law Distinction
A third, and hitherto underappreciated move that the Legal Process
School deployed is of direct relevance to our discussion of copyright law. This
was its conscious–analytical conﬂation of public law and private law through
its theory of law and its idea of institutional settlement. While some aspects
of this move were implicit in the working of the theory, other aspects were
deliberate extensions of its central ideas. The traditional (and standard)
understanding of private law focused on analyzing a substantive area through
the horizontal relationship between the parties to a dispute, using the ideas
of right and duty. Social considerations of a collectivist nature—that would
extend beyond the immediate context of the claimants—were treated as
distinctively secondary in this understanding.
The theory’s attempt to dilute the primacy of juricentrism, discussed
previously,304 formed its implicit move in this direction. Since historically
most areas of private law were also common law subjects that were developed
substantively by courts, the dismantling of juricentrism naturally moved the
theory’s construction of “law” away from a private law orientation that
emphasized the parties’ claims (horizontal in nature) as the primary basis for
lawmaking in the area. Additionally, insofar as courts—even in state
jurisdictions—could be overridden by legislatures on questions of social
policy, the common law (in both substance and in method) ceased to represent
the core ideal of what a well-functioning legal system represented in the Legal
Process account.305
The theory’s more overt conflation of private law and public law was
systematic, and a consequence of its institutional focus. Recall that for Hart
and Sacks, the idea of “policy” was synonymous with the purposes and
302 Id. at 151.
303 See, e.g., Kevin

M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 383-408 (2012)
(deriving the idea of “purposivism” from the Legal Process School and applying it to the
interpretation of administrative regulations).
304 See supra text accompanying notes 253-258.
305 See HART & SACKS, supra note 8, at 165 (noting how the legislature has the “last word” on
the content of the law).
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objectives of a regime.306 And since the ultimate purpose of any legal
arrangement was its furtherance of “group” living or collectivism, the very idea
of policy readily partook of a public orientation.307 Policy, in other words, was
principally a stand-in for notions of “social engineering” that sociological
jurisprudence had made famous.308 Insofar as legislatures held primary
responsibility for questions of collectivist social policy, and statutes were seen
as embodiments of such policy when brought into existence, statutory regimes
were presumptively, to Hart and Sacks, public-regarding in their orientation.
Statutes had purposes—or policy goals—which emanated from the
legislature’s attempt to develop arrangements to govern interactions between
individuals in the future.309 Since the legislature was by deﬁnition a
collectivist institution presumptively representative of diverse segments of
society, its focus was meant to be on public goals. Consequently, every
legislative intervention was in eﬀect a manifestation of public goals, quite
regardless of the individual subject area at issue. It is crucial to note that this
was hardly just a serendipitous consequence of the Legal Process theory’s
other precepts. It emerged instead from a fairly conscious realization (on the
part of Hart and Sacks) that all conﬂicts—even when private—had important
spillover eﬀects for the public that required collective management. One
scholar thus analyzes their impetus in the following terms:
[A]s scholars whose primary focus was private law, Hart and Sacks were well
aware of both the ubiquity of conflict and the diversity of interests in human
affairs. They understood that law must accommodate the often competing
interests of producers, distributors, wholesalers, retailers, and consumers, taking
account of the parallel competition among federal, state, and local regulators
acting through legislative, executive, administrative, and judicial channels.310

Private (law) conﬂicts were thus more than just the concern of the private
parties involved in it. Such conﬂicts needed to be proactively managed and,
as far as possible, avoided. To this end, collective solutions that were
legislatively (or administratively) developed allowed for such management.
Insofar as legislation represented a collective solution produced through a
public process, and indelibly derivative of social concerns, statutes came to be
understood within the Legal Process account as the subject of “public law.”311
306 See id. at 141 (“A policy is simply a statement of objective.”).
307 Id. at 3.
308 ROSCOE POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 64 (1968).
309 See Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 8, at lviii.
310 Dorf, supra note 22, at 925.
311 Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 8, at lxix-lxxvii; see also

Julius Cohen, Towards
Realism in Legisprudence, 59 YALE L.J. 886, 887-90 (1950) (describing the role of legislation as public
policy formulation).

1156

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 1101

In equating statutes and legislation with public law, Legal Process theory
therefore consciously underemphasized the traditional divisions of law that
had predated its advent. While Hart and Sacks were themselves less explicit
about this move, later scholars writing in the tradition have emphasized how
the theory laid the ground work for a “public values” based approach to the
construction and interpretation of statutes.312 It is important to appreciate
the far-reaching signiﬁcance of this move: any legislative intervention
(statute) in an area of law traditionally considered “private law” was now quite
legitimately infused with public/collectivist considerations.313
Legal Process theory is credited with having created the modern “public
law” curriculum that is today the mainstay of American legal education.314 It
achieved this result by emphasizing the transsubstantive nature of its precepts
and arguments, and by downplaying the signiﬁcance and normativity of the
law’s traditional divisions. In focusing on the arrangements of law and its
“administration,” Legal Process underplayed the role of substantive rules in
individual areas and avoided speciﬁcation of the discrete normative values
that inﬂuenced them. The divide between private law and public law areas,
which had until then been a mainstay of American (and indeed most common
law) thinking, fell victim to this move.
As a prime example of this move within Legal Process thinking, consider
the very ﬁrst problem that Hart and Sacks use to illustrate the functioning of
their theory in The Legal Process: “The Case of the Spoiled Cantaloupes.”315
On its face, the problem is a simple contractual one relating to the sale and
shipment of cantaloupes from a wholesaler to a distributor, who discovers
them to be decaying upon arrival.316 The dispute proceeds to litigation—
which is private in nature, being about contractual performance.317 In their
exposition of the problem, Hart and Sacks ﬁrst set out information about the
agreement and then information relating to the nature of the American
industry involving the trade of fruits and vegetables.318 They later move to
describing the federal regulations issued by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture concerning the diﬀerent grades of fruits, and the inﬂuence of this
gradation on the practices and norms among merchants.319

312 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1012-13 (1989).
313 For a recent attempt to examine the interaction between private law and statutory

interpretation, see Jeﬀrey A. Pojanowski, Private Law in the Gaps, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1689 (2014).
314 Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 8, at liii.
315 HART & SACKS, supra note 8, at 10.
316 Id. at 10-11.
317 Id. at 12.
318 Id. at 10-15.
319 Id. at 35-45.
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What converts the dispute from an ordinary breach of contract lawsuit into
a more complex case is the presence of a special enactment known as the
Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (“PACA”), which authorizes the
Department of Agriculture to regulate the sales of fresh and frozen fruits and
vegetables to ensure against unfair practices.320 In addition to authorizing the
issuance of regulations, the PACA also creates a special dispute resolution
mechanism that allows for the adjudication of private disputes without a
formal civil complaint.321 In their problem, Hart and Sacks therefore have one
party commence a proceeding under the PACA when the nonperformance
occurs.322 The adjudication results in a finding for the respondent, who then
promptly appeals the matter to the district court, which then relies on standard
contract law principles to find for the petitioner, concluding that the implied
warranties of quality and description were breached.323 On appeal to the First
Circuit, the court vacates the district court decision, concluding—as a matter
of simple contract law—that the contract had no right of rejection, despite the
warranty being breached, but that damages could be claimed.324
Yet the matter does not end there. The Department of Agriculture ﬁles a
petition for rehearing with the First Circuit, seeking a reconsideration,
claiming that its interpretation of the relevant administrative regulation—
under the PACA—covered the dispute and was owed due deference under
principles of administrative law.325 The court relents and issues an amended
opinion, this time deferring to the Department’s interpretation since it was
not “plainly erroneous,” despite conceding that it might have chosen to
interpret and apply the Act diﬀerently.326
All of the decisions that the problem represents are actual cases decided by
courts. Hart and Sacks use the problem to illustrate the working of institutional
settlement and the idea that legislative and administrative guidance should
override judicial discretion in many situations, even where a court thinks that its
own judgment would be substantively better than the one actually reached by
another institution.327 Lurking underneath the institutional settlement, however,
is a subtle and underemphasized conversion of the dispute from one about private
law to one about public law, a move that the Legal Process account celebrates.

320

Pub. L. No. 71-325, 46 Stat. 531 (1930) (codiﬁed as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 499a–499t

(2018)).
321 7 U.S.C. § 499f(a) (2018).
322 HART & SACKS, supra note 8, at 46-47.
323 Joseph Martinelli & Co. v. L. Gillarde Co., 73 F. Supp. 293, 296 (D. Mass. 1947).
324 L. Gillarde Co. v. Joseph Martinelli & Co. (Gillarde I), 168 F.2d 276, 280 (1st Cir. 1948).
325 HART & SACKS, supra note 8, at 56-57.
326 L. Gillarde Co. v. Joseph Martinelli & Co. (Gillarde II), 169 F.2d 60, 61 (1st Cir. 1948).
327 HART & SACKS, supra note 8, at 57-58.

1158

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 168: 1101

The existence of a legislative intervention in the area produces a
comingling of private contract law concerns and broader institutional/social
ones in the case. This in turn forces the appellate court to consider not just
the parties’ interests and claims, but also the broader (social) implications of
its holding. Whereas the administrative tribunal and the district court both
treat the problem as one of contract interpretation and breach, the appellate
court adopts an interpretive rule that “[w]hen terms which have been given a
deﬁnite meaning under [a statute] are used . . . in transactions governed by
the [statute], it can not later be maintained that a diﬀerent meaning was
intended.”328 Legislative intention therefore overrides any presumptive
contractual intention. On reconsideration, the appellate court then makes an
all-important structural move. It aﬃrms the primacy of the “policy”
underlying the statute (that is, the PACA) over not just its own ruling and
interpretation of the law, but also the basic ideals of contract law and the
autonomy of the parties that had speciﬁcally contracted in the case.329 The
court thus agrees with the executive’s (i.e., the United States’s) position that
“buyers would not be discouraged from rejecting” if they are able to obtain
damages and reverses itself, apparently agreeing that the policy of
discouraging wrongful rejections was paramount.330 Regulating the collective
behavior of all parties (that is, all future buyers) thus overtly overrides a
contractual rule that the court otherwise saw as sound and as being in step
with basic, established contract law principles. Implicit in the supremacy of
the legislature and executive over the judiciary here is the primacy of the
collectivist policy over individual/private contract law principles.
Hart and Sacks’ ﬁrst problem merely highlights a recurring, but hitherto
unacknowledged, impulse in The Legal Process, which is to develop public law
solutions—driven by institutional considerations and collectivist normative
motivations—to private law problems and disputes. And in the process, the
theory dismantled the traditional divide between private law and public law.
B. Remaking American Copyright Law
As noted previously, the private law conception of copyright continued to
hold sway through the Legal Realist era, principally owing to its emphasis on
juricentrism, even when unconstrained. The era of Legal Realism coincided
with the New Deal, the extensive economic relief and regulatory legislation
passed by the Roosevelt Administration as a response to the Great

328 Gillarde I, 168 F.2d at 280.
329 Gillarde II, 169 F.2d at 61.
330 Id. at 60-61.
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Depression.331 While scholars have debated the intellectual cross-currents
between Legal Realism and New Deal thinking, the latter undoubtedly took
the focus of law and legal reasoning in the direction of public law and
administration. Indeed, some have even argued that the emergence of New
Deal legislation during the period itself played a role in diluting Legal
Realism’s reliance on juricentrism.332
Leaving aside this independent cross-fertilization, the New Deal agenda
seems to have had little direct impact on domestic copyright thinking as such,
other than delaying its reform. The dawn of World War II also contributed
to this. In the period between 1925 and 1940, debates about copyright reform
focused on ensuring that U.S. copyright law conformed to the international
copyright system, manifested in the Berne Convention.333 The war and its
aftermath—among other reasons—resulted in an abandonment of these
eﬀorts, with the U.S. eventually deciding not to join Berne.334 Following this
decision, the U.S. decided to propose its own alternative international
copyright regime, the “Universal Copyright Convention,” which produced
minimal changes to domestic copyright law.335 Thus, by 1955, U.S. copyright
lawmakers had made a self-conscious decision to allow domestic copyright
law to remain sui generis in the international landscape.
The heyday of Legal Process theory was the 1950s, a period during which
post-New Deal thinking coalesced with the perceived need for a new account
of law (and legal institutions). It was also during this very period that the
growing call for domestic-focused copyright reform ﬁnally met with success,
when in 1955, Congress authorized the Copyright Oﬃce to initiate a
“program of research and studies” leading to a “general revision” of domestic
copyright law.336 The impetus for this delegation to the Copyright Oﬃce
appears to have been twofold: one, the perception that the Copyright Oﬃce
was indeed the body with the requisite expertise on the subject; and two, the
unique structure of the Oﬃce as a branch of the Library of Congress, which
ensured direct congressional oversight over the process.337 Over the next
331 Marcus J. Curtis, Note, Realism Revisited: Reaﬃrming the Centrality of the New Deal in Realist
Jurisprudence, 27 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 157, 157-58 (2015). For a more elaborate account of the New
Deal and its eﬀect on lawmaking and adjudication, see BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW
DEAL COURT (1998); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2000).
332 Curtis, supra note 331, at 159.
333 REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 1961 REPORT, supra note 33, at x (describing this history); see
also ABE A. GOLDMAN, STUDY NO. 1: THE HISTORY OF U.S.A. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION
FROM 1901 TO 1954, 4-12 (1955) (providing a history of these debates).
334 GOLDMAN, supra note 333, at 12.
335 See id. at 14. For a thorough overview of the Universal Copyright Convention, see generally Paul J.
Sherman, The Universal Copyright Convention: Its Effect on United States Law, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 1137 (1955).
336 REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 1961 REPORT, supra note 33, at x.
337 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 1185-86 (1994).
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three years, the Oﬃce produced thirty-four studies on diﬀerent aspects of
U.S. copyright law.338 What is important to note in this revision is that the
Oﬃce selected not just areas that had been hitherto legislated upon, but, in
addition, areas of copyright law that had until then been entirely the creation
of courts.339 Between 1958 and 1974, Congress (and the Copyright Oﬃce)
held a series of meetings and consultations, which in turn produced myriad
compromises that allowed the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976.
The legislative history leading up to the Act certainly does not reveal an
express reliance on the Legal Process framework of thinking. Yet, as scholars
have noted, the inﬂuence of Legal Process theory—in its Hart-Sacks
formulation—was at once pervasive and indirect.340 Its intellectual inﬂuence
emerged through multiple indirect channels. Law students, who would go on
to clerk for prominent federal judges and Supreme Court justices, were
trained on the Hart-Sacks materials and cognate texts that incorporated
several of its basic ideas.341 Several prominent Supreme Court justices were
not just aware of the framework, but openly subscribed to its ideas.342 With
courts and judges openly channeling the theory’s basic precepts, especially
the “tripartite structure of government” and the “authority of administrative
agencies” in specialized domains, the inﬂuence of the theory was therefore
mostly indirect but intellectually powerful—representing a shift in mindset,
rather than a direct application.343 Indeed, few legal theories see their
inﬂuence ever realized directly, and so it is with Legal Process and copyright.
This perhaps also explains why the academic decline of Legal Process
thinking in 1960s did little to stymie its inﬂuence as a model of lawmaking
and reasoning among courts and policymakers.
The best evidence of the Legal Process theory’s inﬂuence on copyright
thinking is seen in the legal regime that eventually emerged from the
comprehensive revision process, which reveals a direct instantiation of the
theory’s central insights. In examining this revelation, two preliminary
observations are worthy of note here.

338 REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 1961 REPORT, supra note 33, at x-xi.
339 See, e.g., GEORGE D. CARY, STUDY NO. 12: JOINT OWNERSHIP OF COPYRIGHTS (1958);

ABRAHAM L. KAMINSTEIN, STUDY NO. 11: DIVISIBILITY OF COPYRIGHTS (1957); ALAN LATMAN,
STUDY NO. 14: FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS (1958).
340 See Eskridge & Frickey, Making, supra note 17, at 2047-48 (noting the prevalence of the
Hart-Sacks formulation in the legal academy).
341 Id. at 2046-47.
342 Id.; see also Philip P. Frickey, Avoiding Constitutional Questions in the Early Warren Court:
Judicial Craftsmanship and Statutory Interpretation, in EARL WARREN AND THE WARREN COURT:
THE LEGACY IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN LAW 209, 213-14 (Harry N. Schreiber ed., 2007);
Eskridge & Frickey, Introduction, supra note 8, at civ.
343 Wiecek, supra note 248, at 870.
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First, the new “regime” that emerged was much more than just the text of
the statute. It instead encompassed a complete shift in mindset, encapsulated
not just in congressional intervention (i.e., the statute) but also in
corresponding changes in the approaches of the federal judiciary and
administrative agencies on questions of copyright. Indeed, their interaction
and coordination formed a central part of the theory’s core. Consequently, the
transformation that occurred was not purely a post-1976 one, but instead one
that began to take shape in the 1950s and 1960s as well, and which coalesced
with the eventual text of the legislation that emerged in 1976. Indeed, the seeds
of this change are to be seen in some of Justice Frankfurter’s opinions on
copyright law. In one opinion delivered during the war, he thus openly
advanced a new account of what courts should be doing in copyright cases:
It is not for courts to judge whether the interests of authors clearly lie
upon one side of this question rather than the other. . . . We do not have such
assured knowledge about authorship, and particularly about song writing, or
the psychology of gifted writers and composers, as to justify us as judges in
importing into Congressional legislation a denial to authors of the freedom
to dispose of their property possessed by others.344

The shift therefore had begun well before the passage of the 1976 Act,
which merely cemented it.
Second, as a causal explanation it is very plausible that the central tenets
of Legal Process theory that were developed by Hart and Sacks (and Fuller)
were themselves representations of a changing landscape, which had begun
to emerge around them. In other words, insofar as much of their theory was
plausibly descriptive (rather than prescriptive) of the contemporary legal
system of the time (a reality reﬂected in the fact that many of their
hypotheticals were actual legal cases and problems), the dramatic change that
came to be seen in the copyright regime was hardly a direct eﬀect of the
theory in isolation, and more the product of changes in overall legal thinking
that Legal Process theory merely captured and distilled. This latter insight
certainly does not in any way diminish the inﬂuence of Legal Process theory
on copyright. It merely suggests that such inﬂuence may have been
explanatory and justiﬁcatory, rather than purely causal.
1. The Triumph of Copyright Collectivism
The copyright regime that emerged following World War II represented
a clear triumph for collectivist ideals. Beginning in the 1950s, after a full
century and a half of U.S. copyright law having been in existence, federal
344 Fred

Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 657 (1943).
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courts deciding copyright cases began to speak of a “copyright policy” for the
ﬁrst time, a trend that continues to this day.345 This is far from being a mere
coincidence, given how commonplace the phrase eventually became
thereafter and its complete absence from copyright jurisprudence until then.
Indeed, what is worth emphasizing is that nothing signiﬁcant had changed as
such in the content of the copyright statute (or in related jurisprudence) from
the prior era to this one, rendering the sudden onset of this usage intriguing.
A closer analysis of courts’ use of the idea reveals a few additional details
about their reasons for doing so. First, it came to be used as a stand-in for the
purposes and objects underlying the copyright statute.346 In other words,
statutory policy and statutory purpose came to be used interchangeably, in
much the same way as Hart and Sacks had. What is important about this
development is therefore that courts for the ﬁrst time began expressly
identifying a deliberate purpose to the enactment of copyright law, beyond
those internal to the doctrine itself. Purposivism thus emerged as an express
hallmark of copyright law. Equally crucial to note is that courts remained
deliberately vague on the precise contents of this policy, which they merely
referenced on a case-by-case basis.347 Nonetheless, it alluded to the existence
of an overarching reason behind the existence of copyright, one that some
courts even traced back to the Constitution.348 This leads us to a second
observation about the prevalence of this usage, namely that courts used it to
hint at the existence of a systematic “scheme” behind U.S. copyright law.349
Not only was the reference to “copyright policy” an allusion to the existence
of legitimate purposes behind the statute, but it also was meant to suggest a
systematicity, comprehensiveness, and organization behind these purposes.
Courts thus began the practice of referring to copyright policy, or “federal
copyright policy”350 in deciding individual cases, as an added justiﬁcation for
345 For the earliest usage of the term in federal copyright jurisprudence, see F.W. Woolworth
Co. v. Contemporary Arts, 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952). For more recent uses of the term, see MetroGoldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929 (2005); Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens
Ltd. P’ship, 737 F.3d 932, 944 (4th Cir. 2013); Forest Park Pictures v. Universal Television Network,
Inc., 683 F.3d 424, 433 n.1 (2d Cir. 2012); SoundExchange, Inc. v. Librarian of Congress, 571 F.3d
1220, 1224 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
346 See F.W. Woolworth, 344 U.S. at 233-34 (equating the two).
347 See supra note 345 and cases therein.
348 See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 839 (10th Cir. 1993)
(referencing the Constitution and then noting that “[c]opyright policy is meant to balance protection,
which seeks to ensure a fair return to authors and inventors and thereby to establish incentives for
development, with dissemination, which seeks to foster learning, progress and development”).
349 See, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 551 (1973).
350 See, e.g., S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 1989) (“This result is
contrary to federal copyright policy . . . .”); Fantastic Fakes, Inc. v. Pickwick Int’l, Inc., 661 F.2d 479,
483 (5th Cir. 1981) (“[A]pplication of Georgia rules to determine parties’ contractual intent . . . [does
not] violate federal copyright policy.” (citations omitted)); Tape Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Younger, 316
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their interpretation and elaboration of particular rules. Not only was such
policy presumptively external to the doctrine itself, but as representative of
broader social concerns, such policy was generally seen as constraining on the
doctrine in individual cases,351 and most importantly, beyond the purview of
courts to question. In one oft-quoted decision, Justice Jackson for instance
relied on “copyright policy” to insist on relying on statutory damages to
achieve a punitive result and deter infringement.352 Inﬂuential commentators
during this period too began using the phrase, some with a direct link to Hart
and Sacks.353 In his 1958 Foreword to the Harvard Law Review, Harvard Law
Professor Ernest Brown, a contemporary of Hart and Sacks and an
interlocutor of the Legal Process,354 used the term “copyright policy” to refer
to the balancing of the “incentive to artistic creativity against the resulting
burden which the copyright imposes upon the public in limiting the available
supply of artistic works.”355
Beyond the rhetoric of judicial reasoning and scholarly opinion, the idea
of a collective social policy undergirding the copyright system reached its
zenith during the comprehensive legislative revision of the statute, which
began in 1955. During this process, copyright collectivism was given an
overtly democratic color through the idea of interest group representation.
During the drafting of the bill, Congress actively solicited participation from
“authors, publishers, and other parties with economic interests” in the
copyright system, and then mediated a negotiated compromise between
them, which it enacted into law.356 Even when Congress was dubious of the
substantive wisdom of such a provision, it nonetheless allowed it into law in
the belief that the representational process—and the compromise that it
produced—represented the “best solution” as a matter of the process values
that it embodied.357 Examples of such compromises abound in the text of the

F. Supp. 340, 345 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (examining whether a statutory provision “interferes with
the Federal copyright policy devised pursuant to this Constitutional authority by Congress in the
Copyright Statutes”).
351 See, e.g., Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 205 n.13 (3d
Cir. 2003) (noting that the “fair use doctrine excuses copying that would otherwise be infringement
in order to vindicate the copyright policy promoting the diﬀusion of ideas”).
352 F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, 344 U.S. 228, 233-34 (1952).
353 See Chafee, supra note 216, at 526; Benjamin Kaplan, Publication in Copyright Law: The
Question of Phonograph Records, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 475 (1955).
354 See Shaw, supra note 28, at 691 (describing Brown’s role in a reading group organized by Hart).
355 Ernest J. Brown, Foreword: Process of Law, 72 HARV. L. REV. 77, 147 (1958).
356 Litman, supra note 2, at 861.
357 See id. at 862 (“The record demonstrates that members of Congress chose to enact
compromises whose wisdom they doubted because of their belief that, in this area of law, the solution
of compromise was the best solution.”).
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1976 Act.358 Compromise was thus seen as worthy for its own sake, and
because it functioned as a stand-in for the representativeness of the process.
One scholar makes the following point: “Such veneration for compromise
runs through the entirety of the Act’s legislative history. Congress invited,
nurtured, and occasionally compelled the compromises embodied in the 1976
Act. Sometimes, it disregarded everyone’s better judgment in favor of giving
eﬀect to the agreement of interested parties. Congress welcomed compromise
for compromise’s sake.”359
Scholars have referred to this process to question the utility of courts’
reliance on the legislative history to discern a congressional “intent,” a
question that need not detain us here.360 All the same, Congress’s overbearing
emphasis on compromise highlights its recognition that the content of the
law was to be collectively determined, through the best representation of the
social interests involved in the regime. Copyright law was not something
innate or naturalistic that required elucidation based on ﬁrst principles (such
as matters of right), but instead a matter of (group) policy, that was guided
by overtly utilitarian considerations emanating from the constitutional text.
A natural, and expected, consequence of this turn towards a collectivist
compromise was a resurgence of utilitarian thinking and rhetoric in copyright
reasoning. While utilitarianism had long informed copyright analysis in the
U.S., the postwar turn towards collectivism gave this dormant framework new
life. Courts, scholars, and lawmakers began to extol copyright’s logic of
“incentives” and “encouragement” for creativity as the raison d’être of the
regime.361 But unlike in the past, this rationale began to make its way into
actual copyright doctrine. The revision process paid closer-than-ever
attention to “market” eﬀects and the idea of incentives,362 and courts leading

358 Id. at 861-62; see also, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (deﬁning “work made for hire”); 17 U.S.C.
§ 109(b)(1)(B) (2018) (describing an exemption from the ﬁrst sale doctrine); 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2018)
(describing the cable retransmission licensing scheme).
359 Litman, supra note 2, at 878.
360 Id. at 879.
361 By the 1950s and 1960s, referencing the utilitarian logic of authorial incentives as copyright’s
primary purpose became commonplace. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S.
151, 156 (1975); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219
(1954); Jondora Music Publ’g Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 506 F.2d 392, 397 (3d Cir. 1974);
United Artists Television, Inc. v. Fortnightly Corp., 377 F.2d 872, 881 (2d Cir. 1967). The ﬁrst serious
examination in the scholarly literature of the incentives logic emerged from Justice (then Professor)
Stephen Breyer. See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 291 (1970). In his argument, Breyer
expressly notes how several aspects of the 1976 Act (then Bill) were motivated by the
utilitarian/incentives logic that he describes in his paper. Id. at 323-50.
362 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 47-50 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.S.C.A.N. 5659, 56595663 [hereinafter H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476].
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up to and following the revision readily followed suit.363 With its insistence
on the collective good—and social welfare—utilitarianism thus became the
central dogma of American copyright thinking, providing the collectivist
orientation of “policy” and the legislative compromise of 1976 with a strong
normative foundation, a reality that continues unabated to this day.364
2. The “Limits” of Copyright Adjudication
In embarking on a comprehensive “general” revision of the copyright
statute and thereupon choosing to codify parts of copyright jurisprudence
that were hitherto judge-made, Congress was of course asserting its primacy
as copyright lawmaker.365 In one sense, this was hardly surprising given that
the Constitution expressly treats copyright as legislative in origin.366 Yet, as
the Register of Copyright at the time pointed out, the new regime “mark[ed]
a shift in direction for the very philosophy of copyright.”367 And this was
undoubtedly its institutional reorientation.
The comprehensiveness of the 1976 codification was meant to send an
affirmative message about the existence of a well-thought-out national
copyright policy for the country. Even when the Act omitted codifying an area,
Congress—through the legislative history and in the text of the Act—took great
pains to make clear that this omission was deliberate or instead represented a
conscious delegation of lawmaking authority to courts.368 And in so doing,
Congress managed to entrench a strong intentionalist framework into copyright
lawmaking.369 Congress’s “intent” was to be treated as paramount within the
domain; other institutions (including courts) were to glean this intent,
elaborate on it, or at the very least make every effort to avoid vitiating it.
Congress was presumed to have either (i) thought about an issue and made its
363 See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985)
(adopting a market-based rationale in discussing a fair use defense).
364 See Balganesh, supra note 44, at 1576-77 (“[C]opyright law in the United States has
undeniably come to be understood almost entirely in utilitarian, incentive-driven terms.”).
365 The Amending Act of 1976 was itself titled a general revision. See General Revision of
Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976); cf. Ringer, supra note 2, at 479
(characterizing the Act as a “radical . . . departure”).
366 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
367 Ringer, supra note 2, at 479.
368 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, supra note 362, at 66-67 (dealing with the fair use doctrine
and noting that the provision was “intended to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not
to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way”); see also id. at 61 (referencing the text’s “[u]se of the
phrase ‘to authorize’ is intended to avoid any questions as to the liability of contributory infringers,”
a doctrine that had been judicially created).
369 For a general overview of this approach, see Cheryl Boudreau et al., Statutory Interpretation
and the Intentional(ist) Stance, 38 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 2131, 2133-38 (2005); Daniel B. Rodriguez,
The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 919, 930 (1989) (book review). The origins
of intentionalism as a distinctive approach are traced back to Hart and Sacks. See id. at 930 n.65.
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intentions clear in the text;370 (ii) thought about an issue and chosen to remain
silent in the text but spoken to the issue elsewhere;371 or (iii) only indirectly
thought about an issue, which was nonetheless to be respected.372 Different
areas of the statute came to be understood as representing these various
intentionalist stances, all of which exalted congressional intent.
It took hardly any time for courts to embrace the intentionalist mindset
in their development of copyright jurisprudence.373 In reality though, the
move in this direction had begun even prior to the enactment of the new
statute. Even the immediate post-1950 copyright jurisprudence is striking in
its turn towards discerning a legislative intent/purpose underlying the 1909
Act, something that was visibly absent in copyright jurisprudence during the
decades before.374 The enactment of the 1976 Act and the elaborate revision
process that it was premised on (all of which was very well-documented)
furthered this trend, such that the search for a congressional intent
underlying diﬀerent provisions of the statute (and thereby a purpose) became
de rigueur after and has subsisted ever since.375
The adoption of this intentionalist framework within copyright certainly
aﬃrmed the idea of “legislative supremacy.”376 Yet it also undid a seemingly
symbiotic relationship between courts and Congress that had existed in

370 See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra note 369, at 930 (observing how even for intentionalists, the text
remains the first stop). For an example in the copyright context, see 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (2018), which
codifies the principle of divisibility of copyright’s rights. The legislative history indicates that the text
represents Congress’s intent to change the law. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, supra note 362, at 122-124.
371 An example of this is the role of intent in understanding whether two or more authors are joint
authors. The text does not emphasize the role of intent as such, see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (defining
“joint work”), but the legislative history makes clear that the “touchstone here is the intention” of the
parties. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, supra note 362, at 120; see also Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 50506 (2d Cir. 1991) (discussing the legislative history concerning intent in joint authorship).
372 A good illustration here is the debate about whether copyright’s distribution right covers
the “making available” of a work. For an overview of this debate, and an argument that Congress
indirectly addressed this issue, see Peter S. Menell, In Search of Copyright’s Lost Ark: Interpreting the
Right to Distribute in the Internet Age, 59 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 6-27, 52-63 (2011).
373 For the use of legislative history to ascertain intent immediately following the passage of
the 1976 Act, see Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Eltra Corp. v. Ringer,
579 F.2d 294, 296-97 (4th Cir. 1978); Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 447 F. Supp.
243, 248 n.2 (W.D.N.Y. 1978).
374 Hardly any pre-1950 decisions paid serious attention to the legislative history of the 1909
Act. Yet, post-1950 (prior to the passage of the 1976 Act), we begin to see courts referencing the
history of the 1909 Act. See, e.g., Miller v. Goody, 139 F. Supp. 176, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Davis v. E.
I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 249 F. Supp. 329, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Williams & Wilkins Co. v.
United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1351 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aﬀ ’d by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
This inquiry reached its fullest recognition in the 1954 Supreme Court case of Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201, 214 (1954).
375 For recent instantiations, see ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431, 441-45 (2014); Kirtsaeng
v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 533-38 (2013).
376 See Rodriguez, supra note 369, at 930 n.66 (discussing the idea of “legislative supremacy”).
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copyright lawmaking until then. Judges and scholars have lamented this turn,
and argued that it unduly limits courts’ role (and expertise) in developing
copyright law.377 All the same, understood through the lens of Legal Process
theory, this framework successfully introduced an important component into
the copyright landscape: institutional settlement.
To Legal Process theory, the subordination of the judicial role—in
lawmaking—was simultaneously both limiting and enabling. On the one hand,
courts were to comply with Congress’s statutory directives, which limited
their broad discretion. At the same time, “reasoned elaboration” made courts
the principal gatekeepers of reason and persuasion in the legal system. And
this gatekeeping function entailed recognizing that there were indeed
moments in the operation of the law where reason had to give way to broader
social considerations.378 Reason was the domain of “principle” and it had to
be continually balanced against the demands of “policy,” a message that was
implicit in the limits placed on courts.
This is precisely what occurred within copyright law, especially following
the comprehensive revision. With the compromise delicately enshrined into
the new regime, courts were obligated to tread cautiously. Implicit in this
mandate was the recognition that in numerous situations (though not all),
copyright policy took precedence over copyright principles. Even when their
reasoned application of principle (to the individual facts of a case) pushed
them in one direction, courts were to remain acutely aware of unsettling the
regime’s policy embedded into the statute. And when the two conﬂicted, the
latter was to unequivocally prevail.379
Copyright adjudication was therefore not to be the primary vehicle for
policymaking. Copyright policymaking came to be seen as ﬁrmly
“polycentric” in nature, a term that Fuller had used to describe situations
where a single decision had implications beyond those limited to the litigating
parties, necessitated greater consideration of its long term eﬀects, and
encompassed areas where “courts move too slowly to keep up with [] rapidly

377 See, e.g., Leval, supra note 39, at 1062 (arguing that the “old [symbiotic] model worked pretty well”).
378 See Dorf, supra note 22, at 981 (observing how “reasoned elaboration” was “subordinated” to

institutional arrangements).
379 For an early example, see Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). In Mazer, the petitioners
advanced the argument—drawn from principle—that patentable subject matter should be excluded
from the gamut of copyrightable works. Id. at 204-05. Their reasoning had to do with the need for
additional scrutiny before designs obtained protection, something that design patents oﬀered but
copyright did not. Id. at 215. The Court rejected this principle-based argument, by reference to the
statutory policy. See id. at 217 (“Neither the Copyright Statute nor any other says that because a
thing is patentable it may not be copyrighted.”). The Court later expressly referenced the overall
“economic philosophy” behind the statute to justify its holding. Id. at 219.
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changing” circumstances.380 Fuller, on whom Hart and Sacks relied heavily
for their theory,381 was clear that polycentric problems were “unsuited to
solution by adjudication,” and had to be solved by tuning elsewhere,
speciﬁcally to legislative (or “deal” based) solutions.382 Fuller’s arguments
found obvious resonance in copyright law. Whereas copyright adjudication
had in previous times been seen as itself generative of the system’s core
principles and ideas, the conception of copyright that emerged from the new
regime was one of a negotiated bargain, wherein the distributional eﬀects and
long-term costs of individualized lawmaking necessitated limiting the role of
courts. The problems of copyright were therefore polycentric.
Fuller’s argument for the limits of adjudication went further:
“Adjudication is not a proper form of social ordering in those areas where the
eﬀectiveness of human association would be destroyed if it were organized
about formally deﬁned ‘rights’ and ‘wrongs.’”383 Implicit in the new regime’s
treatment of copyright as polycentric was therefore the recognition that it
was indeed more than just about rights and wrongs, or in other words, more
than a private law institution that could be managed through the horizontal
interaction between parties. The inadequacy of copyright adjudication as a
method of lawmaking was therefore as much normative—driven by a vision
of the public law/private law distinction—as it was structural, and driven by
the existence of a coherent and comprehensive legislative policy for the area.
3. Administering the Copyright System with Expertise
While the Copyright Office was established in 1897384 and tasked with
administering the various formalities associated with the copyright statute, its
role as an actual lawmaker had remained fairly minimal through 1950. While
the Office had issued regulations under the 1909 Act dealing with the types of
works it would register and the conditions for such registration, these
regulations seldom entered the landscape as an independent source of law. This
changed dramatically in 1954, with the Court’s decision in Mazer v. Stein.385
In Mazer, the Court was called upon to determine whether the copyright
statute allowed protection for artistic articles (a statuette) that were
embedded into articles that served a useful purpose (a table lamp).386 In

380 Fuller, supra note 17, at 394-95. The essay was written in 1959 but published after Fuller’s
death. Id. at 353.
381 See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
382 Fuller, supra note 17, at 398, 400.
383 Id. at 370-71.
384 Act of Feb. 19, 1897, Pub. L. No. 54-265, 29 Stat. 538, 545.
385 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
386 Id. at 202-05.
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answering the question in the aﬃrmative, the Court made direct reference to
the regulations issued by the Oﬃce on the question and concluded that “we
have a contemporaneous and long-continued construction of the statutes by
the agency charged to administer them that would allow the registration of
such a statuette as is in question here,” which was probative on the coverage
of the statute.387 A few things are noteworthy about this observation.
First, it recognized—for the ﬁrst time in copyright jurisprudence—that
the agency (the Oﬃce) was “charged” with administering the statute.388 In
other words, this amounted to an open aﬃrmation that the Oﬃce had a
distinctive role in the copyright landscape beyond just accepting registrations
and deposits. Second, the Court was nonetheless silent on the quantum of
weight the Oﬃce’s interpretation had to be aﬀorded. While Chevron389 and
Mead390 had of course not yet been decided, the case of Skidmore v. Swift &
Co.391 was at the time a whole decade old; and yet, the court chose not to cite
to it.392 Third, the Court did more than just point to the Oﬃce’s
interpretation. Instead it readily adopted the language of the regulation into
its holding, noting that it could “hardly do better than the words of the
present Regulation.”393 This language would then make its way into the
comprehensive revision, and eventually the 1976 Act as well.394
Mazer was hardly a one-oﬀ event. To the contrary, it signaled the regime’s
acceptance of the growing role of the Oﬃce within the copyright system. A
few years later, when Congress embarked on the project of comprehensively
revising the copyright statute, it commenced the task by appropriating funds
for the Oﬃce to carry out a “comprehensive program of research and studies”
to lay “the groundwork for general revision.”395 The Oﬃce then
commissioned a series of reports, and generated a draft statute which formed
the basis of subsequent congressional action and eventually produced a
compromise among the competing interest groups involved in the process.396
Of the thirty-four reports that were eventually produced, ﬁve dealt with the

387 Id. at 213.
388 Id.
389 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
390 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
391 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
392 The Court in Mazer instead chose to cite to the case of Great Northern Railway Co. v. United States,

315 U.S. 262 (1942). Mazer, 347 U.S. at 213 n.26. Great Northern Railway held that a “contemporaneous
administrative interpretation” of a statute is pertinent to its construction. 315 U.S. at 275.
393 Mazer, 347 U.S. at 214.
394 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (deﬁning “[p]ictorial, graphic, and sculptural works”).
395 REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 1961 REPORT, supra note 33, at x.
396 Id. at iii, 149-60.
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functions and roles of the Oﬃce.397 One report in particular, delved into the
question of the Oﬃce’s (i.e., the Register’s) “discretion” under the Act and
the extent to which courts should defer to decisions and interpretations of the
Oﬃce.398 According weight and discretion to the Oﬃce was seen as naturally
connected to “a limit on the court’s power to overrule the Register.”399 Acutely
aware of its growing prominence, this report further recommended:
[T]here is no articulated body of decisions dealing with the extent to which
the courts should attach weight or a presumption of correctness to the
Register's determinations. Although ultimately expressed in the issuance or
denial of an original or renewal certiﬁcate, these determinations cover a wide
range, from decisions on whether a notice is in the right place to decisions on
copyrightability of large classes of works. If it should be thought advisable to
deﬁne the courts’ proper attitude toward Register's determinations,
distinctions might be taken in terms of the kinds of decisions involved.400

While largely unexceptional from today’s perspective, these observations
were fairly bold at the time, given the existing lawmaking dynamic that
subsisted in copyright. Not only had the Oﬃce begun to see itself as playing
a central role in the formulation of the new regime, but it recognized some
value in having the system limit courts’ ability to second-guess its
determinations and rulemaking in various domains.
While Hart and Sacks did not pay as much attention in their account to
administrative agencies as they did to other institutions,401 they nonetheless
saw the exercise of delegated administrative rulemaking as making important
inroads into the role of courts. When such a delegation of lawmaking power
was made, the agency assumed “ﬁrst-line oﬃcial responsibility” for the
area.402 They further argued that when this occurred, “courts will usually
recognize the practical signiﬁcance of the agency’s primary responsibility and
will hesitate . . . to overturn any well-considered determination which the
agency has made . . . .”403 In developing their account of administrative
397 See CARUTHERS BERGER, STUDY NO. 18: AUTHORITY OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS TO REJECT APPLICATIONS FOR REGISTRATION 81 (1959); ELIZABETH K. DUNNE,
STUDY NO. 20: DEPOSIT OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS ix (1960); ELIZABETH K. DUNNE & JOSEPH
W. ROGERS, STUDY NO. 21: THE CATALOG OF COPYRIGHT ENTRIES 51 (1960); BENJAMIN
KAPLAN, STUDY NO. 17: THE REGISTRATION OF COPYRIGHT ix (1958); ; ALAN LATMAN, STUDY
NO. 19: THE RECORDATION OF COPYRIGHT ASSIGNMENTS AND LICENSES 107 (1958).
398 KAPLAN, supra note 397, at 27-28.
399 Id. at 28.
400 Id.
401 HART & SACKS, supra note 8, at 165-66. Hart individually appears to have spent signiﬁcant
time considering the role of agencies separately. Eskridge & Frickey, Making, supra note 17, at 2038.
402 HART & SACKS, supra note 8, at 165.
403 Id. at 166.
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agencies, Hart and Sacks were to a large extent echoing the more elaborate
views of a prior Legal Process theorist—James Landis. Much like his
colleague and mentor Frankfurter, Landis saw administrative agencies as the
solution to a variety of regulatory issues in the post-New Deal economy.404
Institutionally, agencies were endowed with the ability to specialize in a
singular domain and develop an expertise that allowed them to avoid
becoming “jacks-of-all-trades and masters of none,” a problem that he saw as
plaguing courts and Congress.405 Expertise thus emerged as the primary
justiﬁcation for agencies, which Hart and Sacks embellished with an
institutional account in their theory.
Leading up to the general revision, the Office had come to establish itself as
the institutional repository of copyright expertise. Further advantaging it in this
regard was the reality that as a branch of Congress—unlike traditional executive
agencies—the Office could legitimately play a role in the revision process that
affirmed the ideal of legislative supremacy. And this it realized with few
noticeable downsides. Seemingly in return, Congress came to expressly delegate
actual lawmaking authority to the Office under the terms of the statute.406 Since
1976, this has expanded dramatically, with the effect that the Office is today
quite legitimately an independent institutional source of copyright law.407
While the Oﬃce has come to be widely recognized as the agency with
primary expertise on copyright, its unique status—as a branch of the
legislature—continues to impede its recognition as a full-blown executive
agency that is to be shown the level of deference ordinarily accorded to other
federal agencies interpreting their parent statutes.408 While courts continue
to disagree over its status as a pure executive (as opposed to legislative)
agency, they nonetheless continue to aﬀord its interpretations Skidmore
deference, dependent on their persuasiveness in the situation.409 This

404 JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 30-37 (1938). For an overview of the
intellectual cross-currents between Landis and Frankfurter, see THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS
OF REGULATION 155-57 (1984); JUSTIN O’BRIEN, THE TRIUMPH, TRAGEDY AND LOST LEGACY
OF JAMES M LANDIS: A LIFE ON FIRE 50 (2014).
405 LANDIS, supra note 404, at 31.
406 See 17 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2018) (“All administrative functions and duties under this title, except
as otherwise speciﬁed, are the responsibility of the Register of Copyrights . . . .”).
407 For a general overview of the Oﬃce’s role in the current copyright system and its eﬀorts to
improve that system, see Pallante, supra note 40.
408 See United States v. Brooks, 945 F. Supp. 830, 834 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (adopting the view that the
Office is a legislative institution). But see Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 684
F.3d 1332, 1341-42 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (taking the position that the Office is an executive branch agency).
409 See, e.g., Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., 755 F.3d 1038, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2014) (ﬁnding
Oﬃce’s reasoning set forth “[i]n an opinion letter and an internal manual” to be persuasive); Alaska
Stock, LLC v. Houghton Miﬄin Harcourt Publ’g Co., 747 F. 3d 673, 684-86 (9th Cir. 2014) (ﬁnding
the Oﬃce’s longstanding registration policy persuasive and worthy of deference). The Oﬃce
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phenomenon is precisely what both Legal Process theory and the Court in
Mazer contemporaneously advanced, to eﬀectively introduce a new source of
institutional lawmaking into the domain.
In entrenching the idea of the Copyright Oﬃce as the expert body on
copyright law, and investing it with lawmaking and policymaking authority,
the post-1950 copyright regime eﬀectively came full circle in adopting and
venerating the structural and functional lessons of Legal Process theory and
its emphasis on institutional settlement as the central idea of law. Copyright
law was thus no longer just about either judicially crafted principles, or indeed
legislatively delineated directives, but instead also about the Oﬃce’s
interpretation and application of those sources (i.e., case law and statutory
directives) in individual cases. Copyright law had thus fully entered the
consciousness of the modern administrative state.
***
Copyright Register Barbara Ringer was undoubtedly correct when she
emphasized that the regime coming out of the comprehensive copyright
revision of 1955–74 had adopted an altogether new “philosophy.”410 And this
was its move in the direction of a public law model, wherein institutional,
administrative, and policy-based considerations would dominate. Indeed,
what it produced was an altogether diﬀerent conception of copyright law.
Therein the content of the law was directly connected to the question of
institutional authority, and the overt instrumentalism that such authority
came to represent—under the inﬂuence of Legal Process theory.
The ﬁgure below graphically illustrates much of this move away from the
private law conception, which focused on the rights and duties of the litigants
around core principles, to the Realist conception of copyright that had courts
adopt an ex ante but nonetheless juricentric approach to copyright
lawmaking, to ﬁnally the Legal Process-inﬂuenced public law approach
wherein the regulation of creativity and creative markets through
institutional coordination came to dominate, and produce the regime
described in Part I.

acknowledges that Skidmore deference is the appropriate level of deference to be accorded to its
interpretations. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM, supra note 5, at 2.
410 Ringer, supra note 2, at 479.
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Figure 1: The Move from Private Law to Public Law in Copyright
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IV. DEALING WITH A HYBRID COPYRIGHT SYSTEM
The U.S. copyright regime that emerged from the 1976 revision—and
which remains in existence today—was therefore fundamentally diﬀerent
from anything that had preceded it. Fully ensconced in the realities of the
administrative state and driven by a turn towards collectivist thinking, it had
quite successfully internalized the core lessons of Legal Process thinking.
Despite the pervasive inﬂuence of Legal Process thinking on its functioning,
modern copyright thinking and jurisprudence have done surprisingly little to
acknowledge this reality and to embrace the fact that it is today a truly hybrid
legal regime revealing a conﬂuence of private law and public ideas and
concepts in its everyday operation. Accepting the reality of this postwar
transformation in the American copyright regime, this Part oﬀers a few
(albeit brief) suggestions on what it would mean for the regime to accept and
embrace its Legal Process orientation.
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Perhaps the most important lesson to take away from the Legal Process
turn in modern copyright law is its inﬂuence on what “copyright law” today
denotes in the American legal system. While copyright law is ordinarily taken
to denote the formal substantive rules of the regime (both statutory and
decisional), the inﬂuence of Legal Process suggests that this conception is
myopic. Copyright law is instead better understood as a “process,”411 and it
encompasses the entirety of the institutional, structural, and directive
arrangements that are collectively directed towards achieving a set of plural
goals—revolving around the management of creative expression. Understood
in this vein, American copyright law is neither exclusively about the private
rights and immunities of creators and copiers, nor indeed entirely about the
public regulation of creative markets. It is instead a combination of
mechanisms and ideas that interact with each other as a system in the pursuit
of coordinating the production and use of creative expression. This holistic,
systems-based approach to the regime produces three further prescriptive
insights for modern copyright thinking.
A. Protocols for Institutional Settlement in Copyright
With the formal content of copyright law today emanating from multiple
institutional actors—Congress, federal courts, and the Copyright Oﬃce—the
regime would beneﬁt from a set of norms and principles allocating diﬀerent
aspects of copyright lawmaking to diﬀerent actors. While each institution
individually plays an active role in the lawmaking process, the questions of
allocation and appropriate settlements become all-important whenever a
potential overlap presents itself.
Looking to the Supreme Court’s copyright jurisprudence over the last two
decades reveals some useful patterns of institutional settlement in the
copyright regime. While these patterns have never been expressly articulated
by the Court in its decisionmaking, their development and explication would
prove to be of enormous guidance and value to lower courts (district courts
and courts of appeal) where the problems of such settlement present
themselves on a fairly regular basis.
Indeed, examining the Court’s jurisprudence reveals the following general
patterns of institutional settlement. First, when it comes to questions
involving the structure of the copyright entitlement as expressly and
unambiguously delineated by Congress in the statute, Congress’s views are to
be treated as peremptory. Courts are not to “second-guess” congressional
“policy judgments” even if seen as overtly “unwise,” unless it alters the

411

HART & SACKS, supra note 8, at cxxxvii, 148.
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“traditional contours” of copyright.412 Second, on questions relating to the
copyright entitlement where Congress has not expressly spoken or acted,
courts may develop and elaborate Congress’s policy preferences while
ensuring that such preferences are not overridden or negated.413 Third, where
Congress has not indicated a preference at all, or has instead revealed an
incomplete preference, courts can treat the question as an implicit delegation
of power to them to settle the question through situational adjudication.414
Fourth, where the question relates directly to copyright adjudication and the
settlement of individual disputes, courts are at liberty to develop the law
through the use of general principles.415
We might usefully call each of these settlement approaches: peremptory
settlement, compatibility settlement, adjudicative settlement, and principled
settlement, respectively; and each is well-represented in the Court’s
copyright jurisprudence. The problem is of course that the Court itself hardly
articulates these norms, with the result that they remain hidden underneath
the substantive content of the law, often eluding lower courts. Embracing the
Legal Process turn in copyright thinking would likely enable a clearer
articulation of these protocols, all of which derive from the theory’s core idea
of “institutional settlement.” The table below reﬂects this variation in
settlement approaches.

412 Eldred v.
413 See, e.g.,

Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208, 221 (2003).
ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431, 451 (2014) (interpreting the public
performance right to apply to online retransmissions); Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568
U.S. 519, 525 (2013) (interpreting the ﬁrst sale limitation on the distribution right to apply
internationally).
414 See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936-37 (2005)
(developing the principle of liability for inducement of infringement); Campbell v. Acuﬀ-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (developing the transformative use variant of fair use).
415 See, e.g., Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 684 (2014) (ﬁnding the
doctrine of laches inapplicable to the copyright statute); Feltner v. Columbia Picures Television,
Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 355 (1998) (looking to historic practice to conclude that the award of statutory
damages was a question for the jury); Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994) (developing
an equal treatment principle in the award of attorney’s fees).
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Table 1: Institutional Settlement Protocols in Copyright
SETTLEMENT

QUESTION

PROTOCOL

EXAMPLES

Peremptory

Express
Delineation of
the Entitlement

Eldred v. Ashcroft;
Golan v. Holder

Compatibility

Indirect/Implied
Delineation

Adjudicative

Complete or
Partial
Delegation

Congress has final
say; complete
deference unless
“traditional
contours”
impacted
Congress has final
say; but
determining
congressional
intent a matter of
compatibilist
elaboration
Contextual
lawmaking in
common law style

Principled

Aspects of
Copyright
Adjudication

Lawmaking
through
transsubstantive
general principles

Kirtsaeng v. John
Wiley; ABC, Inc. v.
Aereo, Inc.

Campbell v. AcuffRose, Inc.; MetroGoldwyn-Mayer
Studios Inc. v. Grokster
Petrella v. MetroGoldwyn-Mayer, Inc.;
Fogerty v. Fantasy;
Feltner v. Columbia
Pictures

B. Reasoned Elaboration as the Elaboration of Copyright Principles
While the idea of institutional settlement certainly reveals a preference
for copyright lawmaking to emerge primarily from majoritarian institutions,
i.e., Congress, this hardly implies a passive role for courts. Indeed, this is a
reality that is often forgotten about Legal Process theory. In requiring courts
to avoid second-guessing Congress on certain questions, the theory
nonetheless encourages them to assume primary responsibility on others.416
The theory therefore implicitly carves out a domain of legitimacy for courts
within the copyright space. This domain of legitimacy derives from courts’
presumptive monopoly over “reasoned argument.”417

416 HART & SACKS, supra note 8,
417 Fuller, supra note 17, at 366.

at 146-47.
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The hallmark of courts therefore lies in their reliance on “reason” as a
mechanism of social ordering, and the primary conduit of such reasoned
argumentation was seen to be the use of “principles”—arguments internal to
the doctrinal domain at issue, and which are asserted as claims of justice or
morality demanded by that domain.418 Courts therefore rely on principles in
their elaboration, whereas Congress relies on considerations of policy, which
are external to the regime itself.
Whereas copyright reasoning in the post-1950 regime has paid acutely
close attention to issues of policy and to ensuring the existence of a coherent
copyright policy, courts have yet to fully embrace their role as the regime’s
guardians of principle. In elaborating on congressionally determined policy,
under the protocols of settlement described previously, courts should remain
steadfast in identifying and developing a set of “copyright principles,” a
domain that is their exclusive prerogative. To the contrary, modern courts
seem content to identify and examine the scope of Congress’s copyright
policy to decide individual cases, taking the question of settlement (and
deference) entirely at face value.419
A large part of why copyright law has remained a coherent subject through
the ages is because several of its bedrock principles have remained constant
and meaningful over the years, despite the regime’s transition in policy
priorities. Indeed, even the Supreme Court appears to have endorsed this
idea, when it noted that Congress was not at liberty to alter the “traditional
contours” of copyright law, a phrase that references what have long been
thought of as copyright principles such as the idea-expression dichotomy or
copyright’s unwillingness to protect facts.420
Copyright law would thus beneﬁt from a more direct judicial engagement
with its basic principles. Courts ought to see themselves as the guardians of
reason within the copyright system, work towards identifying the internal
rationality of copyright doctrine using various principles,421 and then attempt
to synthesize congressional policy with these principles. The balance between
principle and policy was an integral component of the Legal Process theory,
which allowed the law to retain an internal intelligibility and determinacy
418 Id. at 372.
419 See, e.g., ABC,

Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431, 447 (2014) (relying purely on the statute to
ﬁnd liability); Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 523-25 (2013) (focusing on
statutory policy to develop the ﬁrst sale doctrine rather than oﬀering principles); Kienitz v. Sconnie
Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758-59 (7th Cir. 2014) (abandoning the judicially-formulated
transformativeness principle and focusing on interpreting the statute using statutory policy).
420 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003). For more on the traditional contours of
copyright, see generally Robert Kasunic, Preserving the Traditional Contours of Copyright, 30 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 397 (2007).
421 These principles could include the idea/expression dichotomy, the exclusion of facts,
originality, ﬁxation, authorship, merger, substantial similarity, and the like.
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that rendered it more than purely political. If copyright law is to subsist as a
coherent idea in the new regime, it will inevitably fall to courts to assume
their role as the gatekeepers (and protectors) of reason within the functioning
of the regime and eﬀect a balance between policy and principle. Courts ought
to give the idea of “traditional contours” more consideration in their
adjudication422 and use it to elaborate on diﬀerent aspects of the copyright
statute, adopting what has been described as a “dynamic” approach to
statutory interpretation.423
C. Developing an Administrative Copyright Law
While the Legal Process turn in the copyright regime has forced it to
confront the realities of the modern American administrative state, including
the ideals of divided lawmaking and interbranch coordination, the substantive
law governing this interface has lagged behind. The role of the Copyright
Oﬃce within the copyright system has only grown over the course of the
latter half of the twentieth century.424 The truest aﬃrmation of its status as a
full-ﬂedged rulemaking body emerged in 1998, when it was granted the power
to create exceptions to the copyright statute’s anticircumvention provisions
for “particular class[es] of copyrighted works” through a rulemaking
proceeding.425 During such rulemaking, the Oﬃce is allowed to consider a
variety of diﬀerent factors on a discretionary basis.426 Quite independent of
this, the Oﬃce is also given the unilateral authority to appoint Copyright
Royalty Judges to adjudicate various royalty disputes under the statute.427
Despite this growth in the role and responsibilities of the Oﬃce,
copyright jurisprudence itself has spent surprisingly little time addressing the
substantive integration of the Oﬃce into the skein of copyright law. To the
contrary, courts routinely attempt to avoid such questions even when
confronted with them.428 Complicating the matter is the growing diversity of
422 Very few courts have given the concept due consideration since the Supreme Court’s use of
the phrase in Eldred. But see, e.g., Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 893 (9th Cir.
2005) (en banc) (noting how the balance between authors and society is realized in “the traditional
contours of copyright protection” (quoting Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221)).
423 See Eskridge, supra note 296, at 1484 (describing the “evolutive perspective” as a core part
of this approach).
424 See Pallante, supra note 40, at 213-14 (discussing the Oﬃce’s public education programs and
revisions of Oﬃce standards and practices).
425 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (2018).
426 Id. § 1201(a)(1)(C)(v).
427 Id. § 801(a)–(b).
428 See, e.g., Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. Aereokiller, LLC, 851 F.3d 1002, 1013 (9th Cir. 2017)
(“To resolve this issue, we would be required to rule on constitutional questions that could have
outsized consequences relative to this case—such as determining whether the Library of Congress
is a legislative or executive agency.”).
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functions and determinations that the Oﬃce itself makes—which range from
the mere registration of works and digesting substantive law as part of its
operations manual, to coordinating with other branches and agencies and
making actual rules in speciﬁc areas. If copyright law is to fully embrace the
Legal Process turn and accept its role as a hybrid public–private law, it is
about time for it to develop a body of administrative law dealing with its
working, a body of “administrative copyright law,” so to speak.
First and foremost among these questions is the level of deference that
the Oﬃce should be accorded by the other branches.429 The Oﬃce’s various
decisions and rulings are worthy of being disaggregated and treated
diﬀerently. Some merit greater judicial (and legislative) scrutiny and
conversely less deference, and vice-versa. The Oﬃce’s decisions on individual
registrations for instance, are vastly diﬀerent from its eﬀorts to synthesize
case law into abstract principles without applying them to individual cases.430
Second are issues of interagency coordination.431 Since the Oﬃce is
commonly seen as a branch of the legislature, in recent years the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Oﬃce (USPTO) has begun to assume a role in the
development of copyright law and policy.432 As a formal branch of the
executive, the USPTO is seen as performing the role of a true executive
agency, which has created obvious operational friction and produced a shared
administrative space that would beneﬁt from overt mechanisms of
coordination. A third set of administrative law issues relates to the Oﬃce’s
role in copyright adjudication, through the appointment of royalty judges and
the creation of claims tribunals. While agencies routinely create
“administrative law judges” (ALJs), the Oﬃce’s unique status again requires
examining the extent to which the constraints (and enablement) of the
traditional framework carry over into this domain,433 especially given the
reality that copyright law—unlike other forms of intellectual property—
depends extensively on adjudication for its functioning.434

429 For past consideration of this question, see Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc., 755 F.3d
1038, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2014); Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 286 (3d Cir. 2004);
Norris Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 696 F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1983).
430 See Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 478 (6th Cir. 2015) (discussing
the levels of deference to be accorded to diﬀerent Oﬃce interpretations).
431 For an overview of how and why agencies share regulatory responsibilities, see generally Jody
Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (2012).
432 See generally, e.g., DEP’T. OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, COPYRIGHT
POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY (2013) (oﬀering suggestions
for copyright reform as part of the USPTO).
433 For an overview of the role of ALJs in the administrative system, see generally Jeffrey S. Lubbers,
Federal Administrative Law Judges: A Focus on Our Invisible Judiciary, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 109 (1981).
434 Given the absence of registration as a prerequisite for protection, courts undertake the ﬁrst
real scrutiny of the existence and scope of protection.
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If the Legal Process turn in the copyright system is to become meaningful,
it will require confronting some of the complex issues dealing with the
functioning of the administrative state—as they apply to copyright. This is
hardly just an unintended byproduct of the Legal Process turn; instead it
should be legitimately seen as the culmination of the theory’s core premises,
as it has in other domains.
CONCLUSION
Modern American copyright law is an evolved system—nuanced,
textured, and complex. Once understood as primarily a private law
institution, focused on the horizontal interaction between authors and
copiers, it is today treated as a form of public regulation wherein collectivist
ideals and utilitarian goals dominate individual interests. This intellectual
transformation was hardly just a coincidence. It was instead the result of
changes in the very conceptions of law, legal reasoning, and legal institutions
seen in American legal thinking over the course of the last century, which
came to inﬂuence copyright law in signiﬁcant ways.
The modern American copyright system reflects the triumph of a very
influential approach to legal thinking that emerged in the United States
following World War II: Legal Process theory. Predicated on legislative primacy
and democratic governance, and committed to the centrality of institutional
arrangements and divided lawmaking, Legal Process thinking came to inflect
copyright law with an analytical vision that has dominated the discourse ever
since. And this inflection, in turn, systematically converted copyright law into a
framework of public law, a metamorphosis that has gone largely unnoticed. As
this Article has argued, understanding—and embracing—this transformation
yields important functional insights about the working of the modern copyright
system, as well as lessons for future reform efforts in the area.
The intellectual trajectory of American copyright law over the last century
further suggests that it is only likely to mutate even further in the future,
especially as legal thinking and reasoning themselves continue to evolve and
keep up with changes in socioeconomic and political conditions. The key to
fully appreciating copyright therefore lies in recognizing that its underlying
legal normativity is incapable of being understood in isolation, or as
disconnected from the rest of the political and legal system. It may therefore
be premature to speak of the “next great Copyright Act” or the “next great
Copyright Office” in isolation, both of which are phrases that derive from the
current Legal Process framing of American copyright law—which may well
no longer be the regime’s dominant intellectual paradigm decades from now.
Should that occur, copyright law will be a very different creature from what it
is right now. Fortunately or not, only time will tell.

